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I. INTRODUCTION
ATEN AN AIRCRAFT crashes, one of the early questions is:VV"Is there insurance?" This is quickly followed by the ques-
tion: "Is there coverage under the insurance policy?"
Insurance policies are generally not recognized for their clar-
ity, and a breach of any part of the policy may cause a denial of
coverage. One essential question is whether the breach of any
part of the policy must have a causal connection to the loss to
justify a denial of coverage. The answer depends upon which
state's law applies and which part of the policy was breached.
An aircraft owner who purchases a typical aviation insurance
policy may not get the peace of mind he or she paid for.' For
example, if that aircraft owner is covered for pilot error and
makes a pilot error, such as switching to an empty fuel tank,
then gets into an accident, he or she could be out of luck.2 An
insurance company could deny coverage for a reason that is al-
together unrelated to the accident,' which is precisely what hap-
pened in the 2006 Nevada case Griffin v. Old Republic Insurance
Co.4 That kind of result-a denial of coverage based on a tech-
nicality-has been described as "[b] ad news for the owner," but
an "[i]mportant lesson[ ] for us."'
I John S. Yodice, Pilot Counsel: Insurance and Airworthiness, AOPA PILOT (Feb.
2004), available at http://www.aopaia.com/displayarticle-07.cfm.
2 Id.
3 Id.; see also Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 133 P.3d 251, 253 (Nev. 2006).
4 Griffin, 133 P.3d at 253.
5 Yodice, supra note 1.
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But what kinds of "lessons" are learned from this scenario?'
The aviation insurance world has long been plagued by this very
issue.' While some courts take those lessons and create law to
prevent them from happening again,8 others continue to frus-
trate aircraft owners by allowing insurance companies to avoid
paying losses completely unrelated to the insured's policy viola-
tion.' Some courts, like the Nevada court in Griffin, will release
6 See id. This article is based on the Nevada case Griffin, 133 P.3d at 251.
7 There is a significant split of authority among jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bayers v.
Omni Aviation Managers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D. Mont. 1981) ("It is
acknowledged that a split of authority exists ... ."); Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. O'Brien,
662 P.2d 639, 640 (N.M. 1983) ("There appears to be a split of authority in juris-
dictions which have passed on this question."); Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678
S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. 1984) ("The rule is by no means unanimous . . . ."); see also
Derrick J. Hahn, General Aviation Aircraft Insurance: Provisions Denying Coverage for
Breaches That Do Not Contribute to the Loss, 64 J. AIR L. & CoM. 675 (1999); Timothy
Mark Bates, Comment, Aviation Insurance Exclusions-Should a Causal Connection
Between the Loss and Exclusion Be Required to Deny Coverage?, 52J. AIR L. & COM. 451
(1986).
8 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (West 2007); Bayers, 510 F. Supp. at 1207 (ap-
plying Montana law); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F. Supp.
967, 978 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (applying Illinois law); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F.
Supp. 142, 151 (D. Haw. 1975); Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. King Craft Custom
Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
McDaniel, 187 F. Supp. 614, 618 (N.D. Miss. 1960) (applying Mississippi law);
Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Global Avia-
tion Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Gardner
Trucking Co. v. S.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 376 S.E.2d 260, 222 (S.C. 1989); AIG Avia-
tion (Texas), Inc. v. Holt Helicopters, Inc., 248 S.W.3d 169, 169-70 (Tex. 2008).
9 See, e.g., Bequette v. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters, 429 F.2d 896, 896 (9th Cir. 1970)
(applying Alaska law); Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir.
1969); Globe Indem. Co. v. Hansen, 231 F.2d 895, 1003 (8th Cir. 1956) (applying
Minnesota law); U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Skymaster of Va., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d
995, 1003 (E.D. Va. 2000) (applying Virginia law); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Kovach, 63
F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (D. Conn. 1999) (applying Connecticut law); Roberts v.
Underwriters at Lloyds London, 195 F. Supp. 168, 171 (D. Idaho 1961) (applying
California law, but indicating that the Idaho courts would follow the same rule);
Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 257 (Ariz. 1988); Middlesex
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bright, 106 Cal. App. 3d 282, 291 (1980); O'Connor v. Proprie-
tors Ins. Co., 661 P.2d 1181, 1182 (Colo. 1985); Grigsby v. Hous. Fire & Cas. Ins.
Co., 148 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. 1966); W. Food Prods. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 699
P.2d 579, 584 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. W. Monroe Charter Serv.,
Inc., 504 So. 2d 93, 99 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Urner, 287
A.2d 764, 766 (Md. 1972); U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Cash Air, Inc., 568
N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Mass. 1991); Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 40
N.W.2d 90, 119 (Mich. 1949); Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883, 893
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co.,
204 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Neb. 1973); Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 133 P.3d 251,
255 (Nev. 2006); Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 662 P.2d 639, 641 (N.M. 1983);
Hedges Enter., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 225 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (Sup. Ct.
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an insurer from liability-even for a covered loss-if the insured
is in violation of the policy in another way.'o In other words,
some courts do not require the breach of the policy to be caus-
ally connected or linked to the claimed loss. Other courts, like
in AIG Aviation (Texas), Inc. v. Holt Helicopters, Inc.," have reaf-
firmed the need for insurance companies to show that the in-
sured's policy breach actually contributed to the loss before
insurers can deny the claim and avoid liability-the causal con-
nection requirement.'2 This is the crux of the causal connec-
tion debate: whether or not insurance companies should be able
to deny a policy claim based on an activity unrelated to the acci-
dent giving rise to the claim.
Section II provides a discussion of how the causal connection
question arises. Section III outlines the various types of policy
provisions and how provision labels influence their treatment
when there is a breach. Sections IV and V discuss the general
reasons for and against requiring a causal connection. Section
VII provides a starting point for analyzing how each jurisdiction
will handle the causal connection.
II. HOW THE CAUSAL CONNECTION QUESTION ARISES
A few typical situations make up the majority of the causal
connection disputes:
* The pilot did not have a current medical certificate.13
1962); Baker v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 179 S.E.2d 892, 892 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971);
Avemco Ins. Co. v. White, 841 P.2d 588, 589 (Okla. 1992); Ochs v. Avemco Ins.
Co., 636 P.2d 421, 424 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Economic Aero Club, Inc. v. Avemco
Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 644, 646 (S.D. 1995).
10 Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 192 Cal. App. 3d 866, 872-73 (1987); W.
Food Prods. Co. Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 579, 584 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985);
U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Cash Air, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Mass.
1991).
11 198 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
12 Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D. Mont.
1981); Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. 1984).
13 See U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Skymaster, 123 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999 (E.D. Va.
2000); Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, 510 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D. Mont.
1981); Avemco v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142, 152 (D. Haw. 1975); Sec. Ins. Co. v.
Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 249 (Ariz. 1988); Grigsby v. Hous. Fire & Cas. Ins., 148
S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. 1966); Global Aviation Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368 N.W.2d
209, 212 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger
Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Neb. 1973); Baker v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 179
S.E.2d 892, 892 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971); South Carolina v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358,
358 (S.C. 1977).
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* The pilot was not rated for the type of flight.1 4
* The flight was considered a prohibited use of the
aircraft.1
* The pilot was not named in the policy."
* The aircraft did not have a current annual inspection.
* The aircraft did not have a valid airworthiness certificate.18
The person claiming a loss due to an aircraft accident has the
burden to show that the loss was covered under his or her insur-
ance policy." The insurance company might accept or deny the
coverage outright, or might also try to show that an activity of
the insured fell under an "exclusion" so that the loss is excluded
by the policy.2 0 In many cases, the insurance company might
even try to show another way in which the insured violated the
terms of the policy. 2 1 At this point, courts treat the subject dif-
ferently.2 2 If an insurance company shows that the excluded ac-
tivity or violation occurred in a state requiring a causal
14 Arnold v. Globe Indem., 416 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1969); Bequette v. Nat'l
Ins. Underwriters, 429 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1968); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
McDaniel, 187 F. Supp. 614, 618 (N.D. Miss. 1960); Kilburn v. Union Marine &
Gen. Ins. Co., 40 N.W.2d 90, 118-19 (Mich. 1949); Grigsby v. Hous. Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., 148 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966); Johnson v. Sec. Ins. Co., 481
N.E.2d 1263, 1265 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985); Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d
883, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (student pilot carrying passengers was not properly
rated to be carrying passengers).
15 Global Indem. v. Hansen, 231 F.2d 895, 905 (8th Cir. 1956); Bruce v. Lum-
bermens Mut. Cas. Co., 222 F.2d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1955); Middlesex Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Bright, 106 Cal. App. 3d 282, 288-89 (1980); Hedges Enter., Inc. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 225 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (pilot was flying an
unregistered aircraft against FAA regulations).
16 Roberts v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, 195 F. Supp. 168, 171 (D. Idaho
1961); Am. States v. Byerly, 456 F. Supp. 967, 970 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
17 O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 661 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Colo. 1982); Sec.
Mut. Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 662 P.2d 639, 641 (N.M. 1983); Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins.
Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. 1984).
1s Old Republic Ins. v. Jensen, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1102 (D. Nev. 2003);
Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152, 1152 (Fla. 1981); Gardner Trucking v. S.C.
Ins., 376 S.E.2d 260, 262 (S.C. 1989); Global Aviation Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368
N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Ochs v. Avemco, 644 P.2d 421, 428 (Or.
Ct. App. 1981).
19 Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 719 N.E.2d 955, 959 (Ohio
1999); see also Hahn, supra note 7, at 700.
20 Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 817 So. 2d 687, 697 (Ala. 2001);
Dart Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 52 P.3d 79, 87 (Cal. 2002); Speth
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 35 P.3d 860, 862 (Kan. 2001); Transcon. Ins. Co. v.
RBMW, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 313, 318 (Va. 2001).
21 See, e.g., RBMW, Inc., 551 S.E.2d at 318 (insurer arguing that collapse provi-
sions should preclude coverage).
22 See sources cited supra note 7.
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connection, the analysis does not stop here. Before the insur-
ance company can avoid liability due to exclusion and deny the
claim, it must show that the excluded activity actually contrib-
uted to the loss claimed." This is sensible because the insurance
company is excluding a certain activity to prevent an accident
resulting from that activity. In other words, the banned activity
leading to an accident is exactly the type of situation that the
insurance company is trying to prevent. In a state that does not
require a causal connection, however, no causal link is re-
quired.2 4 The exclusion acts to bar coverage, regardless of
whether the excluded activity caused or contributed to the
loss.25
Numerous states allow an insurer to deny coverage based on
the breach of a policy provision, even if that breach is unrelated
to the loss or accident at issue in the claim.2 ' For example, if a
crash was caused by landing with a defective tail wheel spring
(which is not detectable by inspection), but the owner failed to
have the required annual inspection, the insurance company
can refuse to pay the claim.27 This may occur despite the fact
that the accident is ordinarily covered under the policy and that
the aircraft owner paid a premium for coverage of exactly this
type of risk.28 Those insurance companies recognize that the
accident would have occurred even if the breach had not taken
place, but courts allow them to avoid liability anyway under the
strict interpretation principles of contract law.29
Some states disagree with this logic and require the breach to
be causally connected to the claimed loss before an insurer can
evade its duties under the contract.3 0 In other words, the insur-
ance company must still cover the accident unless the violation
23 See, e.g., Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 938.
24 See sources cited supra note 10.
25 See sources cited supra note 10.
26 See, e.g., Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D.
Mont. 1981) (citing S.C. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358, 362 (S.C. 1977)).
27 See Ochs v. Avemco Ins. Co., 636 P.2d 421, 422, 424 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See 74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5503(d) (West 2008); Bayers v. Omni Aviation
Managers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D. Mont. 1981) (applying Montana
law); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 967, 968 (S.D. Ill.
1978) (applying Illinois law); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142, 151
(D. Haw. 1975); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 187 F. Supp. 614, 618
(N.D. Miss. 1960) (applying Mississippi law); Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152,
1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Global Aviation Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368
N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa App. 1985); Gardner Trucking Co., Inc. v. S.C. Ins. Guar.
CAUSAL CONNECTION
of the policy caused the accident.3 1 Under the causal connec-
tion requirement, the same scenario as above would have the
opposite outcome. Because the overdue inspection did not
cause the accident, the insurer would have been responsible to
the insured for the damages. The courts that follow this reason-
ing do so due to the uneven distribution of negotiation power
among parties to insurance policies," reasons of fairness, 3 and
the lack of prejudice to the insurer since the accident would
have occurred regardless of the unrelated breach of the policy.31
The causal requirement has been developed differently in va-
rious jurisdictions. In many instances, courts adopted the avia-
tion causal connection rule from ordinary non-aviation cases."
The causal connection requirement is typically seen in cases
dealing with coverage disputes on automobile insurance policies
occurring after automobile accidents.3 1 Other states adopted
the rule legislatively.3 1
Many states have not clarified whether a causal connection is
required in the aviation context, or otherwise." Variations pro-
vide even more confusion in this area of law.3 In Colorado, a
causal connection is generally not required, but an exclusion
can be set aside if there is no causal connection and there is a
public policy reason to support it.40 Although not yet applied in
Ass'n, 376 S.E.2d 260 (S.C. 1989); AIG Aviation (Texas), Inc. v. Holt Helicopters,
Inc., 198 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
31 See infra note 35.
32 See generally AIG Aviation, Inc., 198 S.W.3d at 276.
3 Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. 1984).
34 See generally Gardner Trucking Co., 376 S.E.2d at 260.
3 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 187 F. Supp. 614, 618 (N.D. Miss.
1960) (applying Mississippi law) (citing Hossley v. Union Indem. Co. of N.Y., 102
So. 561 (Miss. 1925) (an automobile accident case in which the court required a
causal connection between the breach and the loss)); S.C. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237
S.E.2d 358, 360-62 (S.C. 1977) (following Reynolds v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of
Tenn., 164 S.E. 602 (S.C. 1932), and McGee v. Globe Indem. Co., 175 S.E. 849
(S.C. 1934)).
36 See supra note 35; see also Am. States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F.
Supp. 967, 968 (S.D. Ill. 1978).
37 FLA. STAT. § 627.409(2) (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (West 2007); 74
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5503(d) (West 2008).
38 Research provided no clear law on the aviation causal connection issue for
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, or Wyoming.
See infra Part VII.
3 See O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 286 (Colo. 1982); Chase
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1130 (D.C. 2001).
40 O'Connor, 696 P.2d at 286.
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an aviation case, Washington, D.C. applies a default "efficient
proximate cause" rule.4 1 This rule states: "If a covered peril is
found to be the efficient proximate cause, then the loss is cov-
ered; if a non-covered peril is found to be the efficient proxi-
mate cause, then the loss is not covered."4 2 Thus, even if
excluded activity is a partial cause, by default that activity will
not preclude coverage if there is a more dominant cause of the
covered loss.4 3 Under this rule, the excluded activity can be one
of the causes, but not the biggest contributor. But because it is
only the default rule, if the language in the policy indicates a
different intent to exclude even partial causes, then the policy
language will prevail."
A large number of states have no statutes or recent case law
on the subject, and parties are forced to deduce the likely out-
come without clear guidance. Other courts have covered their
bases by stating a rule that no causal connection is required, but
continue to add that a causal connection existed in the particu-
lar case, raising a question about how the court would rule in a
pure case of no connection between the breach and the loss.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF GENERAL POLICY
PROVISION TYPES
Insurance coverage is dependent upon five types of provisions
in the policy: representations, conditions, conditions precedent,
warranties, and exclusions. Each of these provision types is
treated differently, depending upon the court. So knowing the
basics of these provisions is important.4 5
A. REPRESENTATIONS
A representation is a statement made by the insurance appli-
cant and used by the insurer to determine the amount of the
premium and whether coverage will be provided.4 6 In other
words, this is typically the application for insurance. 4 7 Misrepre-
sentations include oral or written statements made to the in-
surer that are untrue or that have a tendency to mislead, or
41 Chase, 780 A.2d at 1130.
42 Id. (quoting Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. v. Nat'1 Union Fire Ins., 863 F. Supp.
1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1994)).
43 Id.
SId.
45 See Hahn, supra note 7.
46 6 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d §§ 81:5, 81:7 (2010).
47 Hahn, supra note 7, at 678-79.
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incomplete statements that keep the insurer from measuring
the value of the risk.4 Courts assign different elements to a mis-
representation, but such elements may include that:
(1) the representation must be material to the risk assumed by
the insurer; (2) the representation must be false; (3) the insured
must know that the representation was false when made, or he or
she made it recklessly; (4) the insured made the representation
with the intent that the insurer act upon it; or (5) the insurer
relied on the representation.49
If a misrepresentation occurs, coverage may be denied if the
false information was material.5 0 But if the information was im-
material, courts are reluctant to remove coverage.5 1 The insurer
has the burden of proving whether or not a statement was false,
whether it was material, and if required, whether it was fraudu-
lent in nature.52 However, the "insurance company will be pre-
sumed to have acted in reliance on the truth of material
representations."5 3 Examples of a representation often made in
aircraft insurance is information regarding the total hours a pi-
lot has flown or certificates and ratings of the pilot.54
B. CONDITIONS
Insurance companies insert various conditions into policies
that must be "plainly stated and unambiguous in order for it to
be binding."" There are two types of conditions: conditions
precedent and conditions subsequent.5 6 Conditions precedent
are discussed further in the next section. Conditions subse-
quent are conditions that must be maintained after the risk has
already attached.5 7 If not maintained, the contract for insur-
ance will not remain in effect.5" These "provide that a policy
shall become void or its operation defeated or suspended, or the
insurer relieved wholly or partially from liability upon the hap-
48 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 46, § 81:6.
49 Id.
50 Hahn, supra note 7, at 679.
51 Id.
52 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 46, § 82:5.
53 Id. § 82:6.
54 Hahn, supra note 7, at 679.
55 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 46, § 11:6; see also 16 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RicHARD A. LoRD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTs § 49:87 (4th ed. 2000).
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pening of some event, or the doing or omission to do some
act. "5
Because they usually work to the detriment of the insured,'o
conditions are construed against the insurer. Words like "if,"
"provided that," "upon condition that," and "subject to" com-
monly indicate a condition. Others might include "when," "af-
ter," or "as soon as."'6
C. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
A condition precedent is the most common type of condition
in insurance policies.6 1 With this type of provision, the "fulfill-
ment of the condition by the insured must occur before the in-
surer becomes legally liable on the policy."6 4 Under these
conditions, the policy will not be binding until the conditions
have been met.6 5 Examples of conditions precedent are provi-
sions stating that a premium must be paid before coverage is
attached or requirements to answer all application questions to
the best of the applicant's knowledge or belief.66
D. WARRANTIES
A warranty is a statement of certain facts that have been incor-
porated into the insurance policy." This type of provision is
usually a condition that must be met to invoke the insurer's duty
to pay.6" These became very widespread as insurers began to use
them to deny coverage for any minute discrepancy between the
actual facts and the representations made in the policy.6' How-
ever, judges began to rein in their loose usage and the harsh
effects have been lessened.o Now, most states have statutes that
require the misrepresentation to be material, made fraudu-
lently, or such that it would have caused the insurer not to issue
the policy had the insurer known of the misrepresentation."
59 Id.
6o WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 55, § 49:87.
6I COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 46, § 83:27.
62 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 55, § 49:87.
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 46, § 11:6.
66 Id. § 81:20.
67 Id. § 81:10.
68 Id.
- Hahn, supra note 7, at 680.
70 Id. at 680-81.
71 Id. at 681.
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Further, ambiguous terms will be construed against the insurer
or ignored by the courts.7 2
E. EXCLUSIONS
Insurers may cover some risks and exclude others." A policy
provision that excludes coverage or "eliminates coverage for cer-
tain persons, situations, or circumstances, when it would other-
wise exist" but for the provision is an exclusion. 4 These are
different from warranties and conditions set forth in the policies
because they are not promises made by either party, but rather
set aside specific coverage." An exception or exclusion carves
out coverage, limiting liability by stating types of loss to which
the policy does not apply.7' As one treatise author notes:
One need not be a cynic to observe that attempts by insurers to
limit their liability by placing exceptions to or exclusions from
coverage in so-called 'omnibus' policies, while at the same time
representing to the public at large that there is comprehensive
coverage, is, at the least, inconsistent. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that courts regard these attempted exemptions from liabil-
ity with disfavor, and construe them narrowly, often explicitly
invoking both longstanding principles of interpretation and con-
struction as well as public policy when refusing to enforce
them.7
The language of the exclusion must be clear to be enforcea-
ble, and any ambiguity will be construed against the insurer.
The exclusion label has been used to get around the materiality
requirement of warranties, as discussed above.7 3 By calling a
warranty an exclusion, insurers can claim that the coverage
never existed rather than having to show materiality or any con-
tribution to the loss.80
F. DIFFERENCES IN PROVISION TYPES
Although differences exist between the five types of insurance
provisions, it is "difficult to formulate a positive rule of law
72 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 46, § 81:11.
73 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 55, § 49:111.
74 Hahn, supra note 7, at 681.
75 Id.
76 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 55, § 49:111.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Hahn, supra note 7, at 681.
80 Id.
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which shall determine what constitutes [the different provi-
sions]."8 One should start by looking at the definitions of the
provision types.8 2 Although "warranty" and "condition prece-
dent" are often used interchangeably, they have different func-
tions.83  A warranty does not cause the contract to cease
providing coverage, it just provides remedy for a breach. A con-
dition precedent, however, stops operation of the contract if un-
fulfilled.8 4 Unlike a warranty, a representation is made prior to
the forming of the contract and is not a part of the contract.85
G. How PROVISION LABELS INFLUENCE COVERAGE DECISIONS
Provision labels often create "chaos" associated with insurance
coverage debates because these labels can have "a dramatic ef-
fect" on whether coverage exists.86
The different categorization of these provisions has led insur-
ers to cover or deny claims based on that category.87 For exam-
ple, "conditions precedent" are used by some insurers to
preclude the causal connection requirement altogether. 8  The
majority of states in causal connection cases, however, use the
term "exclusion" to identify the particular clause in question."9
81 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 46, § 81:22.
82 See id.
83 Id. § 81:24. These terms are only synonymous to the extent they both de-
mand absolute truth in fulfilling their requirements. Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. § 81:25.
86 Hahn, supra note 7, at 678.
87 Id. at 692; Bates, supra note 7, at 464.
88 U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Producciones Padosa, Inc., 835 F.2d 950, 958 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying Puerto Rico law); Edmonds v. United States, 642 F.2d 877, 883
(1st Cir. 1981) (applying Massachusetts law).
89 Bequette v. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 429 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1970);
Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1969); Globe Indem. Co.
v. Hansen, 231 F.2d 895, 897 (8th Cir. 1956) (applying Minnesota law); U.S. Spe-
cialty Ins. Co. v. Skymaster of Va., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1002 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(applying Virginia law); Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc., 510 F. Supp.
1204, 1206 (D. Mont. 1981); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F.
Supp. 967, 970 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (applying Illinois law); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
McDaniel, 187 F. Supp. 614, 618 (N.D. Miss. 1960) (applying Mississippi law);
Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. 1988); Grigsby v.
Hous. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966); U.S. Fire Ins.
Co. v. W. Monroe Charter Serv., Inc., 504 So. 2d 93, 98-99 (La. Ct. App. 1987);
Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883, 892 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Omaha
Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Neb.
1973) (refusing to apply anti-technicality statute that required a causal connec-
tion for warranties as well as conditions to exclusions); Griffin v. Old Rep. Ins.
Co., 133 P.3d 251, 254 (Nev. 2006); Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 662 P.2d 639,
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Courts typically disfavor insurance forfeiture, giving technical
breaches of warranties or representations little credence, but in-
surance companies have popularized exclusions as a way to "cir-
cumvent" forfeiture of the contract."o "By simply labeling what
would normally be a warranty as an exclusion, insurers can claim
that enforcement of the provision does not forfeit coverage be-
cause coverage never existed for the excluded event."" Exclu-
sions became popular after the Civil Aeronautics Board, now the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), started regulating the
aviation industry.9 2 Because courts had little understanding of
aviation and it was still considered a dangerous activity, they up-
held general policy exclusions in insurance policies in the mid-
twentieth century.9 3 These general policy exclusions froze the
coverage of the policy whenever the aircraft was in violation of a
federal regulation. 9 4 However, when the number of federal reg-
ulations proliferated to the point that it was nearly impossible to
have an aircraft accident that was not in violation of at least one
of them, courts stopped enforcing general exclusion provisions
on public policy grounds.9 5 Yet, some courts still enforce exclu-
sion provisions based on regulatory violations, as long as they
are specific.9"
Although Nebraska has an anti-technicality statute-applica-
ble to insurance policies-that imposes a causal connection re-
quirement, an insurance company was able to avoid paying a
claim by labeling the breached provision an "exclusion."9 Ne-
braska law states that " [t] he breach of a warranty or condition in
any contract or policy of insurance shall not avoid the policy nor
avail the insurer to avoid liability, unless such breach shall exist
at the time of the loss and contribute to the loss."9" While the
640 (N.M. 1983); Hedges Enter., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 225 N.Y.S.2d
779, 784 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Baker v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 179 S.E.2d 892, 894 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1971); Avemco Ins. Co. v. White, 841 P.2d 588, 589 (Okla. 1992); Ochs v.
Avemco Ins. Co., 636 P.2d 421, 424 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Gardner Trucking Co.,
Inc. v. S.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 376 S.E.2d 260, 262 (S.C. 1989).
90 Hahn, supra note 7, at 680-81.
91 Id. at 681.
92 Bates, supra note 7, at 457-58.
93 Id. at 458.
94 Id. at 457-58.
95 Id. at 458-59; Hahn, supra note 7, at 676.
96 Bates, supra note 7, at 459.
97 Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d 162,
164 (Neb. 1973) (refusing to apply anti-technicality statute that required a causal
connection for warranties and conditions to exclusions).
98 NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-358 (2006).
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law appears to impose a causal connection requirement for
breaches of insurance policies, a court refused to apply the stat-
ute to an expired medical certificate, calling it an "exclusion"
that is not covered by the statute.99
The First Circuit held in two cases that a pilot qualification
clause was a condition precedent in order to avoid the causal
connection question.100 Its opinion in Edmonds v. United States
stated two ways that an insurance provision can be a condition
precedent that precludes the application of a causal connec-
tion.101 The provision will be a condition precedent if it either
"relates essentially to the insurer's intelligent decision to issue
the policy" or the policy explicitly uses the words "condition pre-
cedent" or an equivalent.10 2 The Edmonds court held that a bien-
nial flight review requirement was a condition precedent and
relieved the insurer from liability for a pilot's crash landing, re-
gardless of whether the expired biennial flight review was re-
lated to the accident. 0 3
In U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Producciones Padosa, Inc., a provi-
sion stating that only pilots with a certain flight qualifications
will operate the aircraft was labeled a "condition precedent" and
the causal connection issue was not addressed. 104 The court, re-
lying on the test in Edmonds, explained that a provision is a con-
dition precedent if it relates to the insurer's initial decision to
accept the risk; and if a condition precedent is violated, the in-
surer's obligations are void. 05 The court eventually decided the
pilot qualification provision was a condition precedent and
thereby avoided the causal connection issue.10
IV. REASONS FOR A CAUSAL CONNECTION
REQUIREMENT
A. A BREACH THAT Is NOT CAUSALLY RELATED TO THE Loss Is
INHERENTLY IMMATERIAL
An insured's breach of the insurance contract that does not
cause an accident or any damages is immaterial to the accident
99 See Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d at 164.
100 U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Producciones Padosa, Inc., 835 F.2d 950, 958 (1st Cir.
1987); Edmonds v. United States, 642 F.2d 877, 883 (1st Cir. 1981).
101 Edmonds, 642 F.2d at 882.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 880-83.
104 Producciones Padosa, 835 F.2d at 954-55.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 955.
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or the damage that actually does occur.o'0 Under basic contract
law concepts, a party who breaches a contract only affects the
obligations within the contract if the breach is material. 0 8 If the
breach is not material, the aggrieved party may not cancel the
contract; rather, the aggrieved party may only receive damages
for the partial breach.'09 Cancellation is a remedy for parties to
a contract where a breach was material or where the nonper-
formance was a condition to the aggrieved party's
performance."i0
A breach can be considered material if it defeats an essential
purpose of the contract."' This has also been described as go-
ing "to the root of the matter or essence of the contract."'1 2
Courts will consider the seriousness of the breach and the likeli-
hood that the aggrieved party received substantial perform-
ance."13 Some courts have held that material breach will only be
found if the breach renders substantial performance under the
contract impossible.1 4 For example, a court did not find mate-
rial breach when a party failed to deliver four percent of prom-
ised goods." 5 The court considered this "so slight a breach of
the purchase agreement that, as a matter of law, it did not con-
stitute a material breach.""' Similarly, in a contract for sale, an-
107 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1987); see also Nat'1 Ins.
Underwriters v. King Craft Custom Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 476, 479-80 (N.D.
Ala. 1973) (holding that the insurance company cannot avoid their obligations
under the policy because the breach was "immaterial to [the insurance com-
pany's] acceptance of the risk").
10- In re Krueger, 192 F.3d 733, 741-42 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Witco
Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (D. Del. 1999).
109 Curt Odgen Equip. Co. v. Murphy Leasing Co., 895 S.W.2d 604, 608-09
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Ackerman v. McMillan, 442 S.E.2d 618, 620 (S.C. Ct. App.
1994).
110 Prozinski v. Ne. Real Estate Servs., LLC, 797 N.E.2d 415, 424 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2003) ("material breach by one party excuses the other party from further
performance under the contract").
I In re Sandman Assocs., L.L.C., 251 B.R. 473 (W.D. Va. 2000); Interbank Inv.,
L.L.C. v. Vail Consol. Valley Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224, 1228 (Colo. Ct. App.
2000); Prozinski, 797 N.E.2d at 423; Ackerman, 442 S.E.2d at 619-20 ("In order to
warrant a repudiation, a breach must be so fundamental and substantial as to
defeat the purpose of the contract."); Horton v. Horton, 963 S.W.2d 749 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1997).
112 Interbank Inv., 12 P.3d at 1229.
113 See id.; see also Fusion, Inc. v. Neb. Aluminum Castings, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1392, 1395 (D. Kan. 1997).
114 Interbank Inv., 12. P.3d at 1229.
n1 Curt Ogden Equip. Co. v. Murphy Leasing Co., 895 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1995).
116 Id.
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other court did not consider failing to apply for financing within
ten days following the sale a material breach.'1 7
A policy holder's immaterial breach might also be excused if
cancelling the contract would cause a "disproportionate forfei-
ture.""'8 The Restatement Second of Contracts specifically states that
"[tlo the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would
cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-
occurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a mate-
rial part of the agreed exchange.""' While the comments sug-
gest giving the court "sound discretion" on what
"disproportionate forfeiture" means, the Restatement suggests
that the court will have to weigh the policy holder's forfeiture
against the degree that the insurance company sought to be pro-
tected and the degree to which that protection will be lost if the
breach is excused. 12 0
If the activity is not causally connected to the loss and does
not defeat the essential purpose of the contract, it is-logi-
cally-immaterial to the loss and should not excuse nonper-
formance by the promissor (i.e., refusal to pay the claim). A
breach not causally connected is, by definition, an immaterial
breach. It has no bearing on the outcome of the accident be-
cause the accident would have happened regardless of the
breach. The "nonperformance," or refusal to pay a claimant for
a covered loss, is only excused if the policy holder frustrated the
purpose of the policy. 12 1 A policy's purpose is to cover an air-
craft owner from accidental things that cause damage, such as
pilot error, weather conditions, or other outside forces. This
purpose is not defeated by an activity of the insured that does
not cause any harm. Excusing the insurance company's nonper-
formance, or refusal to pay a claim on a covered loss, would fur-
ther create a disproportionate forfeiture in favor of the
insurance company.
Because some damages might be appropriate, perhaps a pro-
rated premium covering the period of activity that constituted
partial breach would be a more appropriate remedy in these sit-
uations. Rather than cancelling the coverage of the entire con-
tract-which is not permitted under the material breach
117 Ackerman v. McMillan, 442 S.E.2d 618, 619-20 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
118 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 229 (1981).
119 Id.
120 Id. cmt. b.
121 See In re Sandman Assocs., L.L.C., 251 B.R. 473, 482-83 (W.D. Va. 2000);
Horton v. Horton, 987 S.E.2d 200, 204 (Va. 1997).
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doctrine-the insurer could institute a fine for the prohibited
activity without causing such an unfair and one-sided result.
Materiality was introduced in the causal connection context
in National Insurance Undeowriters v. King Craft Custom Products,
Inc.1 2 2 In that case, the insurance policy in question applied to
the airplane "only while being operated . . . by [a pilot] having
not less than 550 total pilot flying hours."1 2 3 Bad weather caused
a crash that killed the pilot and two passengers. 12 4 The insur-
ance company refused to pay for the aircraft damage or the pas-
sengers' loss because the pilot had only 484.3 flying hours.12 5
The court, however, concluded that the flight hours were imma-
terial to acceptance of the risk because the policy would have
issued at the same price even if the pilot had less than 550
hours. 1 26 Although the immateriality was not based on a causal
connection question in this case, 1 27 it shows the court's ability to
step beyond the strict contract construction and use a material-
ity analysis.
The Restatement Second of Contracts lists five significant circum-
stances to consider in determining whether a non-performance
is material:1 2 8
a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of
the benefit which he reasonably expected;
b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will
be deprived;
c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform will suffer forfeiture;
d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the
circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to per-
form or to offer to perform comports with standards of
good faith and fair dealing. 12 9
These five considerations make it clear that a causal connec-
tion is fair and should be required in aviation insurance policies.
122 368 F. Supp. 476, 479-80 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
123 Id. at 477.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 477, 479.
126 Id. at 479.
127 See id.
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
129 Id.
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Under the first consideration, the injured party (the insurer)
will not be deprived of any benefit he reasonably expected."'o
The insurer's benefit or position in the bargain is typically only
monthly premiums and indemnifying claims for situations cov-
ered in the policy. If a particular breach did not cause the loss
and another covered condition did, then the insurer would be
in the exact same position it would have been had the breach
not occurred. A non-causally connected breach, therefore,
would not change the insurer's position or deprive it of any rea-
sonably expected benefit.
The second consideration is "the extent to which the injured
party can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit
of which he will be deprived."' As discussed above, the insurer
is not deprived of any benefit, thus it is adequately compensated
through insurance premiums. Note that this result would be dif-
ferent if the excluded activity had actually contributed to the
accident. An insurance company obviously excludes certain ac-
tivities to prevent such accidents. For example, the policy
should not have to cover an accident caused by the pilot doing
aerobatic flips in the air if the pilot's policy excluded that activ-
ity. The benefit arises from preventing this activity or preventing
the resulting loss from this activity, but not from a lucky break
because the insurance company is allowed to detract attention
from the real cause by pointing to a peripheral matter.
The third consideration is crucial because the insured who
violates the policy in a way unrelated to the policy provisions
applicable to the accident will inevitably suffer a forfeiture on
the applicable portion.13 2 For example, a person or company
insured and covered for mechanical defects could lose that cov-
erage if a mechanical defect occurs and the pilot's medical cer-
tificate is expired even by one day. Although the mechanical
defect is technically paid for and covered, that coverage is for-
feited because of the unrelated condition (such as an expired
medical certificate) that in no way contributed to the accident.
Thus, the insurance policy holder will suffer an extreme forfei-
ture by losing out not only on the worthless insurance premiums







Fourth, a court will contemplate "the likelihood that the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure,
taking account of all the circumstances including any reasona-
ble assurances."13 3 While this consideration is not always appli-
cable due to the fatal nature of aircraft accidents, insured
persons are oftentimes able to cure the failure within a short
time of the loss.'34 For example, in Omaha Sky Divers Parachute
Club, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co., the unrelated breach was an
expired medical certificate and the crash was due to brake fail-
ure.1 3 5 Regardless of the fact that the pilot renewed his medical
certificate two days after the accident, the insurer was allowed to
escape liability even after the non-occurring condition was cor-
rected.1 3 6 It seems logical that if a non-occurring condition can
be cured so quickly and it did not contribute to the accident in
question, it should not have any bearing on the insurer's
coverage.
Finally, the court will take into account "the extent to which
the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to per-
form comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing." 3
Realistically, provisions in insurance policies are not bargained
for or negotiated independently.' The insured has little
choice but to accept the policy as is, even though he may not
have a complete understanding of the policy.13' With some-
times thousands of requirements that must be met in an aviation
insurance policy, an insured that is not in compliance with all of
them is not necessarily acting unreasonably or in bad faith. In
fact, if the matter was considered the other way around, it does
not suggest "good faith and fair dealing" to allow an insurer to
continue collecting premiums while believing it has no expo-
sure to risk at all.140
Taking into account these basic principles of contract law and
materiality, the causal connection is a way to ensure that a
breach is material before allowing an insurer to avoid liability
and receive a windfall. The immaterial breach doctrine might
13 Id.
134 See Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d
162, 163 (Neb. 1973).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 164.
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 241 (1981).
-s Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142, 150 (D. Haw. 1975).
139 Id.
140 Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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also gain further endorsement from supporters of the "efficient
proximate cause" doctrine.14 1 While not explicitly subscribing
to the causal connection requirement, the "efficient proximate
cause" doctrine states that occurrence of an excluded activity
cannot bar the operation of an insurance policy unless that ac-
tivity was the main contributing cause.14 2 A secondary cause, be-
cause of the occurrence of another, could then logically be
"immaterial" for the purposes of exclusions. 14 3
B. A CAUSAL CONNECTION REQUIREMENT PROTECTS THE
INSURED'S REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
The reason that some states maintain a causal connection re-
quirement is to protect the insured. Two different lines of rea-
soning typically form the basis for this argument. The first type
of protection is aimed at the insurance customer's reasonable
expectations. 1 44 The second type protects the insured from the
unbalanced negotiating power that typically favors the insurance
company.
Protecting the insured's reasonable expectations is premised
on the insured's belief that an insurer would not insert "a mere
arbitrary provision. "145 Rather, the insurers would have the spe-
cific purpose of relieving themselves from liability caused by the
excluded condition. 1 4 6 Thus, it would be reasonable for a per-
son to think the clause only limits liability resulting from those
excluded activities. 1 47 This type of framework tries to prevent
insurers from denying coverage on a technicality that did not
contribute to the loss.148
For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court used this
type of reasoning when an insurer tried to avoid coverage of an
aircraft accident when the pilot breached the policy by letting
his medical certificate expire.1 4 9 The policy required the pilot
141 See Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1130 (D.C. 2001); see
also supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
142 Chase, 780 A.2d at 1130.
143 Id.
-" See S.C. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358, 361-62 (S.C. 1977); Riordan v.
Commercial Travelers Mut. Ins. Co., 525 P.2d 804, 807 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(discussing a non-aviation case).
14 Collins, 237 S.E.2d at 361-62.
146 Id. at 361.
147 Id.; Riordan, 525 P.2d 804-07.
14 Global Aviation Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa Ct. App.
1985).
149 Collins, 237 S.E.2d at 358, 361.
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operating the aircraft to have a valid medical certificate, but the
court held that the policy afforded coverage because the pilot's
medical condition did not contribute to the accident.1 50
" [W] hen the parties made the contract of insurance, they were
not inserting a mere arbitrary provision, but . .. it was the pur-
pose of the insurance company to relieve itself of liability from
accidents caused by the excluded condition."1 61
Iowa courts similarly require a causal connection.15 2 The Iowa
legislature passed an anti-technicality statute that prohibits the
insurer from denying coverage unless the breach relied upon
contributes to the loss.1 53 An Iowa court gleaned that the legis-
lature's intent was to "protect insureds by preventing insurers
from denying coverage based upon a technical violation of a
policy provision which did not contribute to the loss."154 Thus,
if pilot error caused an aircraft accident upon landing and his
expired medical certificate had no effect on the accident, the
insurer remained liable under the policy.155
C. A CAUSAL CONNECTION REQUIREMENT BALANCES THE
DISPARATE BARGAINING POWER BETWEEN INSURER AND INSURED
The courts that use this line of reasoning recognize that the
negotiating power in insurance contracts is unbalanced."5 ' One
court described an insurance contract not as a negotiated agree-
ment, but "a contract of adhesion, because the terms are dic-
tated by the insurance company to the insured."1 5 7 Some courts
believe that insurance policies are not truly consensual, but are
only available on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis. "158 Because of this,
some courts refuse to follow a strict contract interpretation rule
regarding insurance policies.15 1 Instead, more than just a
strictly construed breach of the insurance contract must occur
to avoid coverage. The breach must be causally related to the
150 Id. at 361-62.
151 Id.
152 Lees, 368 N.W.2d at 212.
153 IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (West 2007).
154 Lees, 368 N.W.2d at 212.
155 Id.
156 See generally Ouellette v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 495 A.2d 1232 (Me. 1985);
Pickering v. Am. Emp. Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 584 (R.I. 1971).
157 Onellette, 495 A.2d at 1235.
158 Pickering, 282 A.2d at 593.
159 See Ouellette, 495 A.2d at 1235.
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loss, thus prejudicing the insurer if the activity was not
excluded.6 o
D. A CAUSAL CONNECTION REQUIREMENT IS INHERENTLY FAIR
Many courts apply the causal connection requirement simply
because it would be unfair to allow an insurance company to
avoid liability based on a technicality."' This reasoning is said
to promote justice, because "[to] deny the insured the coverage
he had paid for where merely a technical breach occurred
would be unfair."162 Another argument expressed is that the
causal connection maintains a sense of parallelism between the
insurer and insured.163 Because a causal connection is required
to gain coverage, a causal connection should be required in or-
der to take coverage away.164
The Florida legislature passed an "anti-technicality" statute
that requires any breach made by the insured on the policy to
increase the hazard before it will void the policy.16 5 The statute
was subsequently applied in Pickett v. Woods, an aviation case in
which the plane's airworthiness certificate was not valid as re-
quired by the insurance contract.'66 Because the accident was
due to pilot error attempting to land in bad weather and no
condition of the aircraft contributed to the crash, the insurance
company was not able to deny coverage based on the invalid
airworthiness certificate.'16 The court in that case also pointed
out that if no causal connection were required, "it would actu-
ally be to the insurer's advantage that the insured failed to re-
new the airworthiness certificate. In such event, the insurer
would collect a premium but would have no exposure to risk
because the policy would no longer be effective."6 s Insurance
160 Id.
161 Bayers v. Omni Aviation Mangers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D. Mont.
1981) (applying Montana law); Amer. States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456
F. Supp. 967, 970 (S.D. Ill. 1978); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142,
151 (D. Haw. 1975); Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); S. Ins. Co. v. Graham, 280 S.W. 30, 31 (Tenn. 1926) (not an aviation case);
AIG Aviation (Texas), Inc. v. Holt Helicopters, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
162 Bayers, 510 F. Supp. at 1207.
163 Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 970.
164 Id.
165 FLA. STAT. § 627.409(2) (2005).





companies receive "a pure windfall of non-liability" under this
rule.' Consumers do not want to pay for coverage they do not
have, and the statute is meant to prevent that kind of
unfairness.17 0
It seems counterintuitive that insurance companies would be
best served if aircraft owners did not stay current in annual in-
spections and pilots operating aircraft did not get regular medi-
cal check-ups, as required by the FAA. In fact, it creates an
incentive for insurance companies to refrain from verifying
compliance with exclusion requirements when issuing the policy
in the first place. Insurers want compliance with exclusions to
lessen the chance that things will go wrong and to limit their
liability. But compliance does not ensure that things will not go
wrong. If, however, the insured does not get these inspections
at all, it may increase the chance of an accident but will eliminate
the liability of the insurance company completely."' The pur-
pose and goals of an insurance company will not be justly main-
tained in the face of these competing self-interests.
Texas also recently upheld its application of an anti-technical-
ity statute in the aviation context in AIG Aviation (Texas), Inc. v.
Holt Helicopters, Inc. on the grounds of fairness and conscion-
ability.1 2 The Holt Helicopters court upheld application of a fire
insurance anti-technicality statute as evidence that Texas public
policy would support a causal connection requirement in avia-
tion contracts.1 7 3 The court in Puckett v. United States Fire Insur-
ance Co. previously used that statute to support the requirement
of a causal connection in aviation contracts because "allowing
an insurance company to avoid liability when the breach of con-
tract in no way contributes to the loss is unconscionable and
ought not to be permitted."174 Texas still recognizes the fairness
principles adopted by Puckett, which, like Florida, recognized
that if insurers were allowed to deny coverage on a technicality it
would essentially allow insurance companies to keep collecting
insurance premiums with no risk. 1 75
16 See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 967, 970 (S.D.
Ill. 1978).
170 See Pickett, 404 So. 2d at 1153.
171 Id.
172 198 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
173 Id. at 281.
174 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984).
175 Holt, 198 S.W.3d at 280.
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Montana is another state that requires a causal connection
based on fairness.1 7 6 For example, an insurer was not allowed to
deny coverage because it would be unfair to do so based on a
technicality where the breach was an expired medical certificate,
and it was undisputed that the pilot's medical condition was un-
related to the crash."7 Similarly, Hawaii did not allow an in-
surer to escape liability due to a lapsed medical certificate
required by the policy where there was no indication it was the
cause of the crash.1 78 "To deny the insured the very thing paid
for ... even though there is no likelihood that (the insurer) was
prejudiced by the breach. . . would be unfair to the insureds."'
The court in Avemco also interestingly noted that the insurance
company's Vice President of Claims revealed in his deposition
that it was not Avemco's policy to check the validity of the medi-
cal certificate when issuing or renewing policies, but it was one
of the first steps taken when a loss was reported.18 0 In other
words, if the insurer was allowed to deny liability here, then it
was okay for the insurer to collect premiums without any
liability.
Tennessee, though never in the aviation context, has cre-
atively decided that a causal connection should be required.8 "
The cases give their reasoning in the form of the same question:
"Suppose a man violates the law against profanity and is shot
while so doing; should that absolve the company from liabil-
ity?" 1 2 The implication from that question is that it would be
unfair to deny coverage to which an insured is entitled based on
incidental activity that could create a windfall to the insurer.
For example, it would be preposterous to think that a murdered
man's wife is entitled to nothing from his life insurance policy
because he said a curse word that was against the law at the time
he was shot.
Moreover, the causal requirement is fair because it is a very
small hurdle for insurers to overcome. If any connection to the
176 Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D. Mont.
1981).
177 Id.
178 Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142, 151 (D. Haw. 1975).
179 Id. (quoting Cooper v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870, 873-74 (NJ.
1968)).
180 Id. at 146.
181 S. Ins. Co. v. Graham, 280 S.W. 30, 31 (Tenn. 1926); Accident Ins. Co. of N.
Am. v. Bennett, 16 S.W. 723, 725 (Tenn. 1891).




accident is shown in a causal connection state, the claim can be
denied. The threshold for showing the connection is low. The
causal connection requirement is fair in that it recognizes that
causal breaches, however small, should not be overlooked when
they cause a loss. The causal connection requirement only seeks
exemption for breaches that are clearly removed from being
even a remote cause of the loss.
E. A CAUSAL CONNECTION REQUIREMENT DOES NOT PREJUDICE
THE INSURER
One of the reasons some states offer to support the causal
connection requirement is that the insurer is not prejudiced in
any way by the non-causally related breach.' This reasoning
follows logically from the fact that if the insured's breach does
not cause the loss, then another condition did cause the loss. 18 4
So, when there is no causal connection, the accident would have
occurred regardless of the breach."' Because insurance compa-
nies, by adding exclusions, only mean to exclude things that
contribute to the risk or harm, a non-causally-related breach
should not violate the insurance policy.186
Illinois is one state that believes there is no prejudice that oc-
curs in requiring a causal connection.1 8 ' The court refused to
relieve an insurer from liability after an accident in which the
pilot was not one of the approved pilots in the insurance policy
when one of the helicopter's rotors detached mid-flight.8 s Be-
cause the mechanical malfunction was not due to any actions of
the pilot, the court determined that there was no increased risk
to the insurer and the accident would have occurred even if an
approved pilot were controlling the helicopter. 189 Similarly, a
Montana court found that lack of prejudice is a convincing fac-
tor in requiring a causal connection:
183 Bayers v. Omni Aviation Mangers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (D. Mont.
1981) (applying Montana law); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F.
Supp. 967, 970 (S.D. Ill. 1978); Martin v. Motors Ins. Corp., 68 So. 2d 869, 871
(Miss. 1954) (not an aviation case, although Mississippi applied the causal con-
nection requirement in aviation cases).
1- Byerly Aviation, 456 F. Supp. at 970.
185 Id.
186 Bayers, 510 F. Supp. at 1207.
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The company inserted the medical certificate provision to guard
against the risk of loss which arises where a person of bad health
pilots an aircraft. In this case, [the pilot's] lack of medical certifi-
cation did not increase the risk of loss to the company, and the
insured's coverage will not be forfeited because of an alleged
technical breach of the policy.'9 o
Although this type of reasoning is rarely used alone and may
not have the stand-alone strength of some of the others, it never-
theless logically supports a causal connection requirement.
V. REASONS AGAINST A CAUSAL CONNECTION
REQUIREMENT
A. A BREACH SUSPENDS COVERAGE WITH No NEED FOR
FURTHER ANALYSIS
In many instances, the causal connection requirement is com-
pletely disregarded in light of holding that coverage is sus-
pended once the breach has occurred."'1 The courts following
this line of reasoning state that the causal connection does not
need to be discussed at all because the breached condition
"served to void [the insurer's] obligations . . . under the pol-
icy." 92 "While the proscribed activity continues, the insurance is
suspended as if it had never been in force."s93 In that way, the
contract will serve to halt coverage when the excluded activity
takes place "with no need to show some additional element."' 9 4
This rationale was used to excuse an insurer from liability for
a claim for damages occurring during an emergency crash land-
ing because the pilot lacked the required medical certificate:
190 Bayers, 510 F. Supp. at 1207.
191 U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Producciones Padosa, Inc., 835 F.2d 950, 955 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying Puerto Rico law); Bequette v. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 429
F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying Alaska law); Roberts v. Underwriters at
Lloyds London, 195 F. Supp. 168, 172 (D. Idaho 1961) (applying California law,
but indicating Idaho law would be the same); Grigsby v. Hous. Fire & Cas. Ins.
Co., 148 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. 1966); W. Food Prods. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 699
P.2d 579, 582 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Urner, 287 A.2d 764,
768 (Md. 1972); Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 40 N.W.2d 90, 92
(Mich. 1949); Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883,893 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977); Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d
162, 164-65 (Neb. 1973); Hedges Enter., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 225
N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Baker v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 179 S.E.2d 892,
894 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
192 Producciones Padosa, 835 F.2d at 955.
193 Hedges Enter., 225 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
194 Macalco, 550 S.W.2d at 892.
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If the loss is not within the coverage of the policy, the casual rela-
tion is not involved. It is immaterial that the excluded use may
not have been the cause of the loss, nor does it matter that the
insured did not know that the pilot had failed to meet the re-
quirements of the regulations.19 5
In another case involving a policy stating that "no person may
act as pilot in command or in any other capacity . .. unless he
has in his personal possession an appropriate current medical
certificate," the court interpreted the policy to mean the risk is
excluded while the pilot is not properly certificated, not if it is
caused by the pilot's lack of proper certification. 19 6 While the
pilot's medical certificate was expired, the court held there was
no need to show a causal connection because "coverage under
the policy simply did not exist."1 9 7
B. AN INSURANCE POLICY IS A CONTRACT THAT SHOULD BE
ENFORCED AS WRITrEN
The most widely used reasoning applied by courts that do not
require a causal connection is that insurance policies are con-
tracts that should be enforced as written.198 This rationale posits
that "[a] n insurance policy is a contract to be construed to effect
the intention of the parties . . .. The best evidence of that intent
is the policy itself ... . The plain language of the limitation must
be respected."' These courts differentiate insurance coverage
questions from tort actions, for which a causal link must be
shown.20 0 The courts believe that imposing a causal connection
requirement "would allow courts to ignore the plain language of
an insurance policy exclusion,"2 0 1 but "courts cannot indulge in
a forced construction ignoring provisions or so distorting them
195 Grigsby, 148 S.E.2d at 927.
196 Baker, 179 S.E.2d at 893.
197 Id. at 894.
198 Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 133 P.3d 251, 254 (Nev. 2006) ("No such
causal language exists in the policy exclusion here . . . . We will not rewrite con-
tract provisions that are otherwise unambiguous."); Ochs v. Avemco Ins. Co., 636
P.2d 421, 424 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (An insurance policy "must be strictly
construed.").
199 Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg v. Estate of Meyer, 192 Cal. App. 3d
866, 872 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
200 U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Skymaster of Va., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1002
(E.D. Va. 2000); Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 40 N.W.2d 90, 92
(Mich. 1949) ("This is not a tort action wherein causal relation is frequently in-
volved."); Witzko v. Koenig, 272 N.W. 864, 867 (Wis. 1937) ( holding in a non-
aviation context that insurance liability is contractual, not tort law).
201 Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. 1988).
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as to accord a meaning other than that evidently intended by
the parties." 2 0 2
These courts also offer as support for their position that they
do not want to change the policy entered into by the parties.203
"To impose such a requirement would only serve to alter the
agreement between the parties to the insurance contract."2 04
Colorado required that an insurance policy "be given the plain
and ordinary meaning" to deny coverage to an insured that did
not have an up-to-date annual inspection. 2 05 Even though the
plane was up-to-date on its 100-hour inspections (which are re-
quired in addition to the essential identical annual inspection),
it was not up-to-date on its FAA annual inspection, and the pol-
icy excluded coverage for losses occurring during violation of
FAA airworthiness requirements, which include the annual in-
spections.2 06 It did not matter that "the scope and detail of the
inspections are exactly the same in all respects." 2 07 Another
court similarly expressed a contradictory holding when allowing
an insurer to deny coverage for an accident when the aircraft
was piloted by someone who was not named in the policy. 208
Amusingly, however, the court noted that it had "[n] o doubt the
[insurer] would have added [the pilot's] name to the policy if
[the insured] would have requested such an addition." 2 09
C. AN INSURER HAS A RIGHT TO LIMIT ITS RISK
Many states argue for enforcing insurance contracts without a
causal connection requirement by pointing to the principle that
an insurance company should have the right to limit its own
risk. 10 Insurance policy provisions "directly affect the risk the
202 Rangers v. Kovach, 63 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181 (D. Conn. 1999) (internal cita-
tions and quotations omitted).
203 U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. W. Monroe Charter Serv., Inc., 504 So. 2d 93, 100 (La.
Ct. App. 1987).
204 Id.
205 O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 285 (Colo. 1982).
206 Id. at 283.
207 Id.
208 Roberts v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 195 F. Supp. 168, 170 (D. Idaho
1961).
209 Id. at 174 ("No doubt the defendant would have added [the pilot's] name
to the policy if plaintiff would have requested such an addition. The record
reveals that [he] was a qualified pilot."). The court blamed the situation on the
"indifference toward his insurance coverage," yet, no one disputed that the in-
sured was up to date in his payments. Id. at 170, 174.
210 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Urner, 287 A.2d 764, 765 (Md. 1972); U.S. Aviation
Underwriters, Inc. v. Cash Air, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Mass. 1991); Omaha
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insurer assumes and upon which premiums are established." 21'
If a causal connection was required, "an unbargained-for expan-
sion of coverage" would result, increasing the risk from its initial
confinement in the insurance policy. 2 12 Thus, endorsers of this
reasoning believe excluding activity that increases the risk of loss
is reasonable.1
Courts have used this reasoning when certain pilot qualifica-
tion requirements are not met, despite the existence of outside
factors.2 14 For example, one court held that an insurer could
limit its risk of loss in flight by covering only pilots that held a
current biennial flight review, even though the accident was
caused by hitting a mound of snow upon landing and was unre-
lated to the flight review.2 1 ' A court in Nebraska similarly held
that the pilot's expired medical certificate relieved the insurer
from any liability on the policy. 2 16 In that case, the medical cer-
tificate requirement overshadowed the fact that the accident was
caused not by the medical condition of the pilot, but by the fail-
ure of the plane's brakes upon landing." So, these courts
make it clear that insurers are not responsible for all risk, but
rather can deny coverage based on a condition unrelated to the
accident.218
D. ENFORCING POLICY PROVISIONS AS WRITTEN ENCOURAGES
COMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY REGULATIONS
When justifying the decision not to require a causal connec-
tion, courts often list safety as a reason for their determina-
tion.219 A court in Arizona stated that a majority of courts
believe "that public policy favors a rule that encourages owners
and operators of aircraft to obey and satisfy safety regulations
Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Neb.
1973); Aviation Charters, Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 712 (N.J. 2001) (lim-
ited holding); Avemco Ins. Co. v. White, 841 P.2d 588, 591 (Okla. 1992).
211 Aviation Charters, 784 A.2d at 714 (quoting Aviation Charters, Inc. v.
Avemco Ins. Co., 763 A.2d 312, 315 (N.J. 2000)).
212 Id.
21s White, 841 P.2d at 591.
214 See Edmonds v. United States, 642 F.2d 877, 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1981) (apply-
ing Massachusetts law); Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d at 164.
215 Edmonds, 642 F.2d at 880, 883.
216 Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d at 164.
217 Id. at 163.
218 Id. at 165.
219 See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. 1988);
Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 662 P.2d 639, 640 (N.M. 1983); Econ. Aero Club,
Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 644, 646 (S.D. 1995).
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applicable to their operation of aircraft."2 2 0 Courts feel that
many policy requirements, such as the mandatory annual in-
spection, encourage aircraft owners to perform these safety in-
spections before the aircraft is flown.2 2 1
Colorado has a different take on the causal connection re-
quirement but does consider safety in its analysis.2 2 2 Its courts
generally do not require a causal connection but will do so if
there is a public policy reason for setting aside the particular
exclusion.2 Because insurance provisions requiring a current
airworthiness certificate protect against accidents caused by op-
erating unsafe planes, public policy is furthered by this safety-
related objective and will not require a causal connection show-
ing.2 24 If the provision were an overbroad exclusion of coverage
in violation of any FAA regulation, it may be in violation of pub-
lic policy due to the sizeable amount of technical requirements
that make it "nearly impossible to have a crash without a viola-
tion of at least one of those regulations."2 2 5 However, the dis-
sent makes the point that virtually all FAA regulations are
related to safety, which makes the requirement useless to the
court's analysis.226 The dissent argues that the majority "sides"
with the insurer by creating an artificial safety requirement, but
the better rule would be to require a causal connection require-
ment.2 2 7 "Given the myriad of such regulations, many of which
are highly technical, and all of which are in some way related to
aviation safety, when the violation does not contribute to the
loss it is unconscionable to allow the carrier to avoid liability."2 28
VI. CONCLUSION
The causal connection debate in insurance law has been un-
settled for years, with some states taking strong positions for or
against the requirement and with a broad range of reasons on
220 Andersen, 763 P.2d at 250.
221 See O'Brien, 662 P.2d at 640; Econ. Aero Club, 540 N.W.2d at 646.
222 See O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 286 (Colo. 1982).
223 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981).
224 O'Connor, 696 P.2d at 285.
225 Id. at 285 (citing Sw. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowsey, 514 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also supra Part II.
226 O'Connor, 696 P.2d at 287 (Neighbors, J., dissenting).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 288.
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both sides. 2 29 But the biggest source of confusion is because
most insurance policies do not address the causal connection
question either way. The most logical solution is for insurance
companies to adopt a position-one way or another-and state
it in bold print on the cover of the policy.
FIGURE 1
Option 1 - Inform the Insured that an unrelated technical breach
may be used to deny coverage:
WARNING: If you make a claim under this policy, we may deny
coverage based on a breach of any part of this policy (or any
agreement before issuing this policy) even if it has nothing to do
with causing the loss.
FIGURE 2
Option 2 - Insert a causal connection requirement into the policy to
eliminate any confusion:
We will not deny coverage for an otherwise-covered loss because
of a breach of this policy unless the breach caused or contributed
to causing the loss.
But purchasers of insurance would not likely want a policy
with the second option. Perhaps the market will help to estab-
lish the first option as the default choice. Until insurance com-
panies take universal action, countless versions of causal
connection laws across the country will continue to confound
legal practitioners and aircraft owners and complicate the state
of the law.
Not covering a loss makes sense if, for example, an owner
failed to get a timely inspection, and a mechanical problem then
causes damage. In such a situation, the problem could have
been recognized and fixed by that inspection. However, deny-
ing coverage does not make sense if the inspection had no way
of uncovering the defect leading to the accident, such that the
inspection would have been of no help. The policy of encourag-
ing aircraft owners to obtain inspections makes sense, but it
does not necessarily achieve its purpose when no causal connec-
22 See AIG Aviation (Texas), Inc. v. Holt Helicopters, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 276, 278
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (supporting the causal connection
requirement).
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tion is required.2 3 0 In Griffin, the owner believed his mechanic
had performed a required inspection, when, in fact, the
mechanic did not as the result of an oversight.23 ' Less than a
month after picking up the aircraft from the mechanic, the
owner, thinking his inspection was current, flew the aircraft.232
The crash was caused by the pilot switching to an empty fuel
tank (pilot error) or by a problem with the fuel system unrelated
to the required inspection.2 3 3 Either way, the cause had nothing
to do with the inspection nor would it have been prevented by
the inspection. Thus, the Griffin court essentially punished the
aircraft owner for his good faith to maintain his aircraft. 4
Cases like Griffin illustrate the ability of the majority's ratio-
nale to be misleading. No causal connection requirement
might superficially appear to be a sensible rule, but upon fur-
ther inspection, it lacks any substance or ability to achieve its
stated goals. Therefore, sensible logic favors the adoption of a
causal connection requirement.




Most likely no causal connection is required for denial of cov-
erage; however, the case on point had a causal connection and a
separate and independent reason for denial of coverage. 3
Insurance companies can most likely deny coverage without
any causal connection-reaching back to an 1892 opinion stat-
ing there is no requirement for a causal connection between an
exclusion and the loss. 2 3 6 However, both the 1892 and 1942
cases show a causal connection, indicating that in a pure situa-
tion with no causal connection, the court may require
coverage.
230 See Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 133 P.3d 251, 256-57 (Nev. 2006).
231 Id.; see also Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Jenson, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1099 (D.
Nev. 2003); Yodice, supra note 1.
232 Giffin, 133 P.3d at 256-57; Jensen, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
233 Griffin, 133 P.3d at 256-57; Jensen, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
23 See Giffin, 133 P.3d at 256-57; see also Jensen, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
235 See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Meadows, 7 So. 2d 29, 31 (Ala. 1942).
236 See Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 10 So. 530, 533 (Ala. 1892).
257 See Meadows, 7 So. 2d at 31; Jones, 10 So. at 533.
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There are no Alabama statutes or court opinions that address
the aviation insurance causal connection question.
2. Cases
a. Continental Casualty Co. v. Meadows 38
Meadows involved a man who, while heavily intoxicated, went
to his mistress's house to confront her husband.23 ' The intoxi-
cated man refused to leave and was subsequently shot by his mis-
tress's husband. 24 0 The insurance company denied coverage on
an accident policy purchased by the decedent because the pol-
icy did not cover loss "if injury is sustained while the insured is
under the influence of any intoxicant."2 4 1 The opinion cites to
Jones to show there is no causal connection required, but in the
same paragraph states there was a causal connection between
being intoxicated and the fatal shooting.2 4 2 The insurance com-
pany also denied coverage under the "intentional act" exclusion
because the mistress's husband "intentionally" shot the in-
sured. 2 4 3 The court agreed that the intentional act exclusion
was valid.244
b. Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Piercy245
A man was insured for accidental death and dismemberment,
which contained an exclusion for driving "[ilf the [i]nsured's
blood alcohol concentration is in excess of 100 milligrams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood."24  The man was in excess
of that blood alcohol concentration and was above the legal
limit, but was killed when another driver under the influence of
alcohol and cocaine crossed the median and hit his vehicle head
on. 2 47 The court referenced the Meadows case and the fact that
the insurer had "no duty to show" causation, and then further
238 Meadows, 7 So. 2d at 31 (mainly dicta on the causal connection question).
239 Id. at 30.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 29, 31.
242 Id. at 31 (citing Jones, 10 So. 530 (Ala. 1892) (being under the influence of
liquor was a valid exclusion, even if being under the influence had nothing to do
with the loss)).
243 Id. at 31, 32.
24 Id. at 32.
245 No. Civ. A, 00-0373-M, 2000 WL 1566535 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2000).
246 Id. at *1, *2.
247 Id.
2010] 861
862 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [ 75
considered the fairness argument.2 4 8 "The [c]ourt [was] mind-
ful of the [insured's] assertion that [the] denial of benefits 're-
sult[s] in a totally fortuitous, unforeseen and arbitrary denial of
benefits owed under the policy and a windfall to the insurance
company,'" but concluded that the result was not unfair due to
the insured's driving in violation of the law. 4
ALASKA
1. Summary
No causal connection is required for denial of coverage.2 5 0
Alaska case law allows aviation insurance companies to deny cov-
erage without any causal connection between the exclusion and
the loss.2 5 1 The stated rationale is that the contract is strictly
construed, no coverage exists, and there is no need to consider
the causal connection question.2 5 2
2. Cases
a. Bequette v. National Insurance Underwriters, Inc.25
The insurance policy covered only when the owners or other
permissive users held proper pilot ratings. 2 54 Because one of the
owners was flying the plane without appropriate flight ratings to
carry passengers, the insurer claimed that the presence of pas-
sengers exempted liability coverage.25" The court held that
there was no coverage because a non-certified pilot was flying
the aircraft. 2 56 There was no existing coverage for the flight with
which the accident occurred, therefore, there could be no issue
of causation (no relevance).25 The court stated that an insur-
ance company had the right to limit the coverage of a policy
issued by it, and when it had done so, the plain language of the
limitation must be respected. 5
248 Id. at *4 (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Meadows, 7 So. 2d 29, 39 (Ala. 1942)).
249 Id. (internal citations omitted).
250 See Bequette v. Nat'1 Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 429 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir.
1970).
251 See id. at 897, 898.
252 See id. at 900.
253 Id. (applying Alaska law).
254 Id. at 897.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See id. at 900.
258 See id. at 897 (basing its decision on the trial court opinion in Nat'l Ins.




No causal connection is required for denial of coverage.2 5 9
Arizona case law allows an aviation insurance company to deny
coverage without any causal connection between the exclusion
and the loss. 26 0 The stated rationale is that this conclusion fa-
vors the plain meaning of insurance contracts and encourages
aircraft owners and operators to obey safety rules.2 6 1
2. Cases
a. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Andersen'26
An aircraft liability insurer denied coverage for a light aircraft
accident on the basis that the pilot did not have a valid medical
certificate.263 The court held that the aircraft insurer was not
required to demonstrate that the crash was causally related to
the pilot's lack of a medical certificate.2 64 In addition, the court
stated "that public policy favor[ed] a rule that encourages own-
ers and operators of aircraft to obey and satisfy safety regulations
applicable to their operation of aircraft."26  The court distin-
guished exclusions from a notice provision as a forfeiture provi-
sion and held that an insured can violate the forfeiture
provisions and still receive the coverage.'
ARKANSAS
1. Summary
A causal connection is probably required for denial of cover-
age, except when the breach is a misrepresentation since a state
statute specifically eliminated the causal connection require-
ment with respect to misrepresentations.2 6 7 One could reasona-
bly infer that other types of breaches might have been included
in the legislative treatment if the legislature wanted to eliminate
the causal requirement, as it did regarding misrepresentations,
259 See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 249 (Ariz. 1988).
260 See id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 250-51.
263 Id. at 248.
26 Id. at 249.
265 Id. at 250.
2- Id. (upholding Lindus v. N. Ins. Co., 438 P.2d 311, 315 (Ariz. 1968)).
267 See S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Cowger, 748 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Ark.
1988).
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the most atrocious of breaches.2 68 There are no cases or statutes
in Arkansas that directly address causal connection require-
ments in aviation insurance policies.
2. Cases
a. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. v. Cowge?69
The insured misrepresented his kidney disease and alcohol-
ism, but died in a tractor accident.270 The court held that due to
section 23-79-107 of the Arkansas Code, it was no longer neces-
sary to show causal connection and that the insurer properly de-
nied coverage. 2 7 1 The court did, however, point out the fairness
and justice considerations it espoused in National Old Line Insur-
ance Co. v. People and suggested that in the absence of the stat-
ute, it would come down on the side of the insurer.7 In People
the court stated:
Fairness and reason support the view that a causal connection
should be essential. Otherwise, when the insured is killed by a
stroke of lightning or by being run over by a car, the insurance
company could successfully deny liability by showing that the in-
sured was suffering from diabetes when he stated that he was in
good health.2 7 1
CALIFORNIA
1. Summary
No causal connection is required for denial of coverage; how-
ever, in the precedent setting case, even if there were a causal
connection requirement, coverage probably would have been
denied because the facts indicate a connection between the pro-
hibited activity and the crash.2 74
The rationale in California case law is that (1) the plain lan-
guage of the insurance contract must be respected, and (2)
there can be no reasonable expectation of coverage. 2 75 The
268 See id. at 337-38 (Hays, J., dissenting).
269 Id. at 332.
270 Id. at 333.
271 Id. at 334 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-107 (West 1987)).
272 Id. at 335-36 (citing 506 S.W.2d 128 (Ark. 1974)).
273 People, 506 S.W.2d at 131, overruled by Cowger, 748 S.W.2d at 334-36.
274 See Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCoy, 165 Cal. Rptr. 45, 50 (Ct. App. 1980).




courts distinguish this analysis from tort analysis, where proxi-
mate cause would be required.7
2. Cases
a. National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Meye"2 77
The pilot's medical certification had expired, but the pilot
was otherwise qualified and current.278 The plane crashed into
the side of a mountain because of pilot error unrelated to the
pilot's physical condition.27 ' The court denied coverage, relying
on Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co. V. McCoy. 2so The court stated
that insurance policies were contracts in which the plain lan-
guage "must be respected."281 While the court "must attempt to
ascertain the insured's reasonable expectation as to coverage,"
when the limiting language of the policy was clear, there could
be no "reasonable expectation" of coverage. 8 However, the
coverage in McCoy would have been denied whether or not
there was a causal connection requirement, and McCoy set the
precedent in California.
b. Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co. v. McCoy28
The aircraft was being used to smuggle marijuana from Mex-
ico to the United States and crashed into a transmission line
three miles south of an unlit airport with no radio communica-
tion.2 8 ' The policy excluded coverage when the aircraft was
used for an "unlawful purpose."2  The court did not require
the insurer to show a causal connection between the unlawful
purpose and the loss.2 87 The court distinguished contracts from
torts, saying the insured's rights flow from the contract, there-
fore proximate cause need not be shown. 8
276 Id. at 636.
277 Id. at 632.
278 Id. at 633.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 635 (citing 165 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1980)).
281 Id.
282 Id. at 635-36.
283 See id. at 635.
284 165 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1980).
285 Id. at 46.
286 Id. at 47.
287 Id. at 50.
288 Id. at 49.
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COLORADO
1. Summary
No causal connection is required for denial of coverage."8
Colorado case law states that the insurer is not required to show
a causal connection; however, an exclusion may be set aside for
public policy reasons (such as an overly-broad exclusion) and
when there is a causal connection.o
2. Cases
a. O'Connor v. Proprietors Insurance Co. 2 9 1
The aircraft had a current 100-hour inspection but not a cur-
rent annual inspection. 9 The insurance policy excluded cover-
age for losses occurring when FAA airworthiness requirements
were not met.2 9 3 The inspector must have had more training to
do the annuals, but the insurer agreed that there was no evi-
dence that not having the designation and a certified annual
inspector caused the accident. 29 4 The court agreed with the de-
nial of coverage, stating that (1) unambiguous provisions should
be given their plain meaning, and (2) safety-related provisions
were not against public policy. 29 5 However, the court stated that
an exclusion for any violation of FAA regulations or violation of
a non-safety-related requirement might be against public pol-
icy.296 The court observed that it would be virtually impossible
not to violate "at least one of [the] regulations" during an
accident.297
The dissent argued the insurer should be required to show a
causal connection because: (1) practically all FAA regulations
were related to safety in one way or another; (2) courts would be
wasting time evaluating provisions on their relation to safety; (3)
violations of government regulations were highly technical; and
(4) it was too burdensome to require the insured to prove a
"negative"-that the violation was not related to the accident. 298
289 See O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282, 283 (Colo. 1985).
290 See id. at 285-86.
291 Id. at 282.
292 Id. at 283-84.
293 Id. at 283.
294 Id. at 284.
295 Id. at 285.
296 Id.
297 Id.




No causal connection is required for denial of coverage.2 9 9
The rationale is that an insurer is entitled to rely on policy provi-
sions to maintain reasonable expectations and that the court
should interpret insurance policies under general contract
rules.oo The court recognized that "[p] ublic policy does not
favor the forfeiture of insurance coverage based on the in-
sured's technical violation of the insurance policy," but weighed
this against the avoidance of "disruption of the parties' settled
expectations." 0 1
2. Cases
a. Ranger Insurance Co. v. Kovachso2
The pilot was not licensed to fly in Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) conditions, and the insurer denied coverage for a crash
that occurred under IFR conditions. 0 3 The court recognized
the split of authority on whether a causal connection was re-
quired, but chose to adopt the "majority view," stating that an
insurance company had the same right as any other party to
state the terms of the contract, provided they were not against
public policy. 304
The insurer in Connecticut was entitled to rely on a policy
provision that unambiguously made coverage dependent on a
pilot meeting certain standards.o The court noted that it inter-
prets insurance policies by the same general rules that govern
any written contract, stating that such policies are "enforced in
accordance with the real intent of the parties as expressed in the
language employed in the policy."30 The court recognized that
"public policy does not favor the forfeiture of insurance cover-
age based on the insured's technical violation of the insurance
policy," but weighed this against avoidance of disrupting the
parties' expectations.so7
2- See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Kovach, 63 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (D. Conn. 1999).
3 Id. at 181.
301 Id. (internal citation omitted).
302 Id. at 174.
303 Id. at 177.
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DELAWARE
1. Summary
A causal connection most likely is required for denial of cov-
erage. There are no Delaware statutes or court opinions that
specifically address the aviation insurance causal connection
question, but Delaware case law generally favors coverage and
the Delaware Code imposes a causal connection on using incor-
rect statements on an insurance policy as a reason for denying
coverage.os
2. Cases & Statutes
a. Bass v. Horizon Assurance Co. 309
The insured was driving an automobile under the influence
of alcohol when the accident occurred, injuring the driver and a
passenger.3 1 o The insurance policy had an exclusion for "bodily
injury sustained by . .. any person ... convicted of driving while
under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drugs.""1 ' But a Dela-
ware statute imposed mandatory insurance coverage for "medi-
cal treatment and for lost earnings sustained by persons injured"
in an automobile accident.312 The court held that the exclusion
was against public policy because it encouraged the "purchase of
insurance for the protection against bodily injury."113 While no
causal connection requirement was discussed, given Delaware's
stance on protection for the insured, it follows that it may favor
the causal connection requirement, which makes it tougher for
insurers to deny liability.314
b. Baltimore Life Insurance Co. v. Royd"'
A false statement in an application for insurance will not bar
recovery if the statement is not material to the risk."' The court
did not consider an immaterial false statement to be a breach.3 1 7
-8 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2711 (West 2010); Bass v. Horizon Assurance
Co., 562 A.2d 1194 (Del. 1989).
309 Bass, 562 A.2d at 1194.
310 Id. at 1195.
311 Id.
312 Id.
31s Id. at 1196.
314 Id.
315 91 A. 653 (Del. Super. Ct. 1914).




c. Marvin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 318
An employer owned an uninsured motorcycle and allowed his
employee to operate it.' The employee then got into an acci-
dent caused by another driver.s2 0 The employee's mother had
insurance for a different vehicle, which she owned.3 2 1 The pol-
icy excluded "benefits for an injury that occurred while the cov-
ered party was operating a vehicle, not covered under the policy,
but which was available for his or her regular use." 2 2 The court
held that the insurer was not liable because the employer fell
under the "regular use exclusion." 23 The court held that it
would enforce exclusions unless they were against public policy,
but made no mention of a causal requirement.324
d. Title 18, Section 2711 of the Delaware Code
The relevant code provision reads:
Incorrect statements [on application for insurance policy] shall
not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless either:
(1) [f]raudulent; or (2) [m]aterial either to the acceptance of
the risk or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or (3) [t]he
insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy or
contract, or would not have issued it at the same premium rate or
would not have issued a policy or contract in as large an amount
or would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard
resulting in the loss if the true facts had been made known to the




A causal connection (efficient proximate cause) is required as
a default, but can be changed through explicitly contracting to
include non-causally-related exclusions.2
318 No. 09C-01-092CHT, 2002 WL 31151655 (Del. Super. Ct. May 2, 2002).
319 Id. at *1.
320 Id. at *2.
321 Id. at *1.
322 Id. at *1 n.3.
323 Id. at *3.
324 See id. at *4-5.
325 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2711 (West 2010).
326 See Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 780 A.2d 1123, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
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The D.C. court's rationale is the value of the freedom to con-
tract, but it will look at causation if the contract is silent on the
causation relationship. 2 The default rule is the efficient proxi-
mate cause doctrine: if both a covered and an excluded risk con-
tribute to the loss, the court will use whichever is the
predominating cause or set the others into motion, looking at
the quality versus the remoteness of the cause.3 28 Under this
doctrine, the insurer will still incur liability if the excluded activ-
ity was a cause when it is "merely incidental.""3 2  This implies the
court's propensity to look at the causal relationship in all
cases.330
2. Cases
a. Chase v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. 33 1
The insured had a homeowner's policy covering the rupture
of pipes.3 The policy explicitly stated that it did not cover "any
loss which would not have occurred in the absence of" earth
movement, regardless of any other dominant causes. 3 The in-
sured's pipes froze and burst, causing the soil to shift and dam-
age the insured's property.334 The court held that the efficient
proximate cause doctrine would apply by default, if not for the
explicit statement to the contrary. 3 3 5
FLORIDA
1. Summary
A causal connection is required.3 36 The Florida legislature
created an anti-technicality statute, which provides that the
breach of the policy must have increased the hazard (causally
connected).' Florida courts apply this statute to aviation insur-
ance policies.338
327 See id.
328 See id. at 1129-30.
9 See id. at 1130.
330 See id.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 1125.
s3 Id. at 1126.
34 Id. at 1125-26.
5 Id. at 1130-31.
336 See FLA. STAT. § 627.409(2) (2005).
7 See id. § 627.409(2).
See Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152, 1152-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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2. Cases & Statutes
a. Section 627.409(2) of the Florida Statutes
The relevant statute reads:
A breach or violation by the insured of any warranty, condition,
or provision of any wet marine or transportation insurance pol-
icy, contract of insurance, endorsement, or application there for
does not void the policy or contract, or constitute a defense to a
loss thereon, unless such breach or violation increased the haz-
ard by any means within the control of the insured."
b. Pickett v. Woods 40
An aircraft's airworthiness certificate was not valid at the time
of the accident where a pilot "flew into the ground while at-
tempting to land in bad weather."3 41 The court held that where
an aircraft "crash was due to pilot error. . . and not the result of
any [equipment] malfunction, the failure to have a valid airwor-
thiness certificate," as required by insurance contract, "did not
contribute to the accident" and the insurance company would
be prevented "from relying on the exclusion [of the insurance
contract] to deny coverage." 4 2
GEORGIA
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.3 4 3 Georgia courts do not
consider exclusions to be within coverage and, therefore, never
get to the causal connection question.3 4 4 Once a particular pro-
vision has been breached, the coverage is suspended, and no
causal connection issues come into question.3 4 5
33 FLA. STAT. § 627.409(2).
340 404 So. 2d at 1152.
34 Id. at 1152-53.
342 Id. at 1153.
3s See Grigsby v. Hous. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. Ct. App.
1966).
34 See id.
345 See Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Ranger Ins. Co., 186, S.E.2d 579, 580 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1971).
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2. Cases
a. Grigsby v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. 3 4 6
A pilot did not have current medical certificates at the time
he made an emergency crash landing causing property dam-
age. 47 The insurer denied coverage because the policy ex-
cluded coverage for damage that happened during flight in
violation of regulations pertaining to the Airman's Certifi-
cates.3 4 8 The court said that the causal relationship was immate-
rial because the loss was not within the policy. 34 9 The court
never discussed the causal question, reasoning that it was not
necessary to answer.s3o
b. Farmers and Merchants Bank of Manchester v. Ranger
Insurance Co. 35 1
A student pilot was carrying a passenger when he crashed.5 2
The pilot did not have sufficient FAA ratings to be carrying a
passenger. 5 3 The presence of the passenger did not have a
causal relationship with the loss, but the exclusions section in
the insurance policy only allowed operation of the aircraft by
pilots with the sufficient FAA ratings.3 5 4 The court held that re-
gardless of this lack of causal connection, the insured was prop-
erly denied coverage. 55
HAWAII
1. Summary
A causal connection is required.3 5' Hawaii courts reason that
it is unfair to deny insureds the very thing they paid for, display-
ing a strong dislike for forfeitures.5 Hawaii courts consider the
lack of a valid medical license to be a representation (condition
subsequent) rather than an exclusion.3 58 However, the courts
346 Grigsby, 148 S.E.2d at 925.
347 Id. at 927.
3- Id. at 926.
349 Id. at 927.
350 Id.
s5 186 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971).
352 Id.
35 Id. at 580.
354 Id. at 579-80.
35 Id. at 580.
356 See Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142, 150 (D. Haw. 1975).
57 See id. at 151.
358 See id. at 149.
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do not require a causal connection in the case of fraud or spe-
cific exclusions.
2. Cases
a. Avemco Insurance Co. v. Chungo
A pilot's medical certificate had expired more than a year
before the crash. 61 In the absence of any showing whether the
state of a pilot's health at the time of the crash had any causative
effects, an aviation insurer could not avoid liability on the pol-
icy, despite the insured's breach of a condition subsequent.362
The medical certificate requirement was not in the exclusions
section of the policy, so this provision was not an exclusion, but
a condition subsequent. 6 Unless this "condition subsequent
can be shown to have contributed to the loss," the insurers' lia-
bility will be maintained.3 6  Hawaii courts strongly consider fair-
ness to the insureds, stating, "It would also disserve the public
interest, for insurance is an instrument of a social policy that the
victims of negligence be compensated." 6
In another interesting note, the Vice President of Claims in
his deposition revealed that "[i]t was not Avemco's policy" to
check the validity of a medical certificate when issuing or re-
newing the policy, but it was one of the first steps taken when-
ever a loss was reported. 6 6 In other words, why issue the policy
when there is no valid medical certificate if you do not believe
you have any liability in that instance?
IDAHO
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.6 7 Idaho courts reason that
rights "flow from contract . . . not tort," and thus an "insurer
may lawfully limit its liability by excluding certain risks and
hazards from coverage. There is a suspension in coverage
35 Id. at 151.
s6o Id. at 142.
361 Id. at 144.
362 Id. at 151.
363 Id. at 149.
3 Id. at 151.
365 Id.
366 Id. at 146.
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whenever the prohibited conduct occurs, therefore, the causal
question is nullified because of the coverage suspension."'
2. Cases
a. Roberts v. Undenriters at Lloyds London 70
The insurance policy excluded coverage when the aircraft was
operated by anyone other than the named pilot.37 1 An aircraft
company did not change the name on the policy when it got a
new pilot, and that pilot was killed when the aircraft crashed
and burned. 3 72 The court held that the insurer was not required
to show a causal connection to deny liability, noting, "The policy
plainly state [d] that the certificate [was] not applicable while
the forbidden conduct existed."3 73 Although the court blamed
the policy holder's "apparent indifference toward his insurance
coverage," it noted that "[n]o doubt [the insurer] would have
added [the pilot's] name to the policy if [the insured] would
have requested such an addition."374
ILLINOIS
1. Summary
A causal connection is required.7 5 Case law states that it
would be "grossly unfair not to require" a causal connection in
the instance of exclusions, when Illinois law requires a causal
connection between conduct covered and loss "for [insurance]
coverage to be afforded."76
2. Cases
a. American States Insurance Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc.37 7
The insurance policy in this case "[did] not cover any flights
except those in which one of the two named pilots is operating
the helicopter."3 7 8 A pilot that was not named in the policy was
369 Id. at 171-72.
370 Id. at 168.
s7 Id. at 170.
372 Id.
373 Id. at 171-72.
374 Id. at 174.
375 Am. States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 967, 968 (S.D. Ill.
1978).
376 Id. at 970.
77 Id. at 968.
78 Id.
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operating the helicopter "when the rotor broke or became de-
tached, causing the crash and deaths." 79 There was no evi-
dence that pilot error caused the crash.3 80 The court noted,
"[I] f the cause of the crash was something other than pilot con-
duct (such as negligent maintenance), the fact that an unnamed
pilot was operating the helicopter did nothing to increase the
risks undertaken."'3 1 The court further found that the insurer
"would in no way be prejudiced by the fact that [the unnamed
pilot] was piloting the aircraft, and the casualty which occurred
is one which it undertook to cover and for which it was paid a
premium. It should not be able to invoke an exclusion to pro-
vide itself a pure windfall of non-liability." 3 3
INDIANA
1. Summary
There is probably no causal connection required. The courts
strictly interpret contracts of insurance, so that when there has
been a violation of a provision the insurer is not required to
extend coverage. 8
2. Cases
a. Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. Siegel
The insurance policy did not cover liability when the aircraft
was piloted by someone without the minimum flight hours or
when operated for a monetary charge.3 86 The pilot crashed dur-
ing landing due to pilot negligence.8 There was no question
that the pilot did not have the minimum number of hours and
that he paid a rental price for the use of the aircraft." The
court held that both breaches were independently legitimate de-
fenses in denying the insurance claim.38 9 The court did not con-
sider the causal connection question in either situation.390
39 Id.




-4 Monarch Ins. Co. v. Siegel, 625 F. Supp. 693, 698 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
385 Id. at 693.
386 Id. at 696.
3 Id.
388 Id.
389 Id. at 699-700.
3- See id. at 698-700.
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IOWA
1. Summary
A causal connection is required by statute for provisions that
make the policy void before the loss occurs.39 ' This has been
interpreted broadly to include all insurance provisions by Iowa
court of appeals, but the supreme court called this into question
in Schneider Leasing, which interpreted it more narrowly. 1 2
2. Cases & Statutes
a. Section 515.101(1) of the Iowa Code
The relevant code provision reads:
Any condition or stipulation in an application, policy, or contract
of insurance making the policy void before the loss occurs shall
not prevent recovery on the policy by the insured, if the plaintiff
shows that the failure to observe such provision or the violation
thereof did not contribute to the loss.3 93
b. Schneider Leasing, Inc. v. United States Aviation Underwriters,
Inc.894
A leasing company owned a plane that was piloted by the dep-
uty sheriff, who did not satisfy the qualifications specified in the
policy.3"5 It rolled over shortly after takeoff, and the cause of
the crash was disputed.39 6 The court found that the statute was
not applicable because the clause did not void the policy before
the loss, but left the policy intact, placing limits only on its appli-
cation.' This case called into question the scope of the statute
as described in the following case. 9
c. Global Aviation Insurance Managers v. Lees 99
The insured crashed a plane while attempting to land on a
wet, grassy strip, misjudging the distance and the speed in land-
391 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (West 2007).
392 Schneider Leasing, Inc. v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 555 N.W.2d
838, 842 (Iowa 1996).
393 IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.101 (1).
394 Schneider Leasing, 555 N.W.2d at 838.
395 Id. at 839.
396 Id.
s97 Id. at 842.
398 Id.
3- 368 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
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ing.4 00 The pilot "did not possess a valid medical certificate" or
airworthiness certificate, but both parties stipulated that neither
of these conditions "contributed to the accident."4 0 1 The policy
contained exclusions applying to both certificates.40 2 The court
decided that the legislature's intent with the anti-technicality
statute was to "protect insureds by preventing insurers from de-
nying coverage based upon a technical violation of a policy pro-
vision which did not contribute to the loss."7403 It interpreted
this as including all provisions with the policy (not just exclu-
sions), because otherwise insurers would be able to mask any-
thing as an exclusion.4 04 Therefore, the insurer was liable in this
instance because the failure to maintain proper certificates was
not the cause of the crash and the loss. 405
KANSAS
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.40 Kansas case law reasons
that insurers have a reason to want to limit coverage and that
public policy supports compliance with regulations.4 0 7
2. Cases
a. Western Food Products Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.408
An exclusion in the policy required a pilot to have a valid
medical certificate,4 09 but at the time of the crash the pilot had
an expired medical certificate.4 1 0 The plain language of the pol-
icy showed a desire by the insurer to limit the coverage.4 1
Therefore, "a causal connection between the accident causing
the loss and the purpose of an exclusionary clause need not be
proven before coverage can be denied by the aircraft insurer on
400 Id. at 210.
401 Id.
402 Id.
-3 Id. at 212.
404 Id.
45 Id.
-6 W. Food Prods. Co. Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 579, 584 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1985).
40 Id.
408 Id. at 579.
4 Id. at 581.
410 Id.
411 See id. at 581-82.
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the basis of the exclusion. "12 The court distinguished other ju-
risdictions requiring the causal connection by saying that other




No causal connection is required.4 1 4 However, the only case
on this matter seems to have a causal connection, suggesting
that a clearly unconnected accident might be decided differ-
ently.4 15 Kentucky will not require a causal connection between
the breach and loss when the contract is unambiguous and it
examines insurance policies under strict contract principles.4 16
2. Cases
a. Arnold v. Globe Indemnity Co.4 17
A pilot was not qualified to fly under instrument conditions
and he was using Instrument Flight Rules, which were excluded
by the policy. 418 The plane took off in cold, foggy weather and
crashed into the side of the mountain.4 19 The insurer claimed it
was not liable, as the loss was not covered by the policy. 420 The
court held that it was "not necessary that the violation ... be the
proximate cause of the loss in order to exclude coverage."421
LOUISIANA
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.4 2 2 Louisiana courts reason
that they do not want to alter a contract agreed to by the
parties.423
412 Id. at 584.
413 Id. at 582.
414 See Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1969).
415 See id.
416 See id.
417 Id. at 119.
418 Id. at 121.
419 Id. at 120.
420 Id. at 121.
421 Id. at 122.
4- U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. W. Monroe Charter Serv., Inc., 504 So. 2d 93, 99 (La.
Ct. App. 1987).
423 See id. at 100.
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2. Cases
a. United States Fire Insurance Co. v. West Monroe Charter Service,
Inc.424
The aircraft liability policy provided that the aircraft must be
operated by a pilot with a current and proper medical certificate
and a pilot certificate with the necessary ratings.4 2 5 An aircraft
flown by a pilot with an expired medical certificate crashed dur-
ing severe rain and thunderstorms. 4 26 The court held that ab-
sent policy language requiring a causal connection between the
exclusion and the accident, failure of the pilot to have a current
and proper medical certificate excluded liability coverage for
the death of passengers killed in the crash, even though the lack




A causal connection is probably required.2 Misrepresenta-
tions are addressed in a statute and do not require a causal con-
nection.4 2 9 However, the court has abandoned the contract-
based rule regarding insurance contracts,4 3 0 therefore it would
likely follow the causal connection rule.
There are no statutes or court opinions on whether there is a
requirement of causal connection between the insured's loss
and the breach before insurer can deny liability.
2. Cases & Statutes
a. Title 24-A Section 2411 of the Main Revised Statutes
Under this statute, misrepresentations will not prevent recov-
ery under the policy unless they are fraudulent or material to
the acceptance of the risk by the insurer.3 1 Cases interpreting
this statue specifically do not examine a causal connection be-
tween the actual loss and the breach, but rather focus on an
424 Id. at 99.
425 Id. at 96.
426 Id. at 95.
427 Id. at 100.
428 See Ouellette v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 495 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Me. 1985).
4-9 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2411 (West 2000).
430 See Ouellette, 495 A.2d at 1235.
431 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2411.
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objective standard of whether it would have affected the in-
surer's decision in issuing the policy.4 3 2
b. Ouellette v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co.4 3 3
An auto insurance policy required prompt notice after an ac-
cident.43 4 Four years after an automobile accident, the insured
notified the insurer of the claim.4 3 5 The insurer denied cover-
age and the court found in its favor. 436 After a discussion about
the traditional contract rule, the court abandoned the contract-
based rule, calling the traditional result of forfeiture "an unde-
served windfall to the insurer."4 3 7 The court recognized the view
"that an insurance contract is not a negotiated agreement, but
rather what we would call a contract of adhesion, because the
terms are dictated by the insurance company to the insured."4 3 8
Therefore, the court declined to follow the analysis of negoti-
ated contracts and instead required the insurer, in order to
deny liability, to "show (a) that the notice provision was in fact
breached, and (b) that the insurer was prejudiced by the in-
sured's delay."43 9
c. York Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bowman440
The insured failed to reveal several driving record convictions
of her two sons in her auto insurance application. 4 4 1 However,
her husband was driving at the time of the accident.4 4 2 The in-
surer denied liability based on the misrepresentation of the
sons' convictions.4 43 The lower court found for the insured
based on the lack of materiality of the misrepresentations and
because of "the risk [undertaken by the insurer was] that Wanda
or Bruce Bowman might operate a motor vehicle negligently"
and not the sons.4 44 On appeal, the court found that the lower
court "focused too narrowly on the actual cause of the loss" and
42 See York Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 746 A.2d 906, 909 (Me. 2000).




43 Id. at 1235
4s Id.
43 Id.




- Id. at 909.
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"[t] he relevant inquiry is not whether the misrepresentations re-
lated to the cause of the particular loss in question.""'
MARYLAND
1. Summary
No causal connection is required but in the single case ad-
dressing the issue, the violation probably caused the damages.4 4 6
Maryland courts will not require a causal connection between
the provision violated and the accident for the insurer to deny
coverage. 44 7 The court has a duty to interpret the contract as
written, and insurers have a right to limit their potential
liability.448
2. Cases
a. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Urnet449
An aircraft crashed while flying in bad weather that was only
suitable for flight with instruments, but the student pilot was not
certified for instrument flight.45 0 The insurance policy stated
that it would not apply to any pilot who did not have the proper
FAA certifications.45 ' The court held that the activity was not
covered, therefore, the insurer had no liability. 452 The court
reasoned that there was no need for any causal nexus between
the injury or death and the forbidden forms of conduct.4 5 3 The
court emphasized that "[w]hile the proscribed activity contin-
ues, the insurance is suspended as if it had never been in
force."4 5 4 The court reasoned that it had a duty to interpret the
contract and that insurers have a right to limit their potential
liability.455
445 Id.
446 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Urner, 287 A.2d 764, 767 (Md. 1972) (citing Uni-
versal Indem. Ins. Co. v. N. Shore Delivery Co., 100 F.2d 618, 620 (7th Cir.
1938)).
44 Id.




452 Id. at 768.
453 Id. at 767 (citing Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. N. Shore Delivery Co., 100
F.2d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1938)).
454 Id.
455 Id. at 765.
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MASSACHUSETTS
1. Summary
No causal connection is required. 6 Massachusetts courts rea-
son that insurers have the right to limit risks based on certain
conditions because there is a direct relationship between these
conditions and what risks the insurer will intelligently decide to
acquire. *
2. Cases
a. Edmonds v. United States'5
A pilot crashed on landing and hit a mound of snow. 59 The
insurer denied recovery based on the insured's failure to meet
the condition precedent of the policy requiring a current bien-
nial flight review.460 The court held that a causal connection is
not required with condition precedents because it relates di-
rectly to the insurer's decision to issue the policy and take the
insurance risk.461
b. United States Aviation Underaniters, Inc. v. Cash Air, Inc.46 2
An aviation liability policy included a clause that stated the
pilot must hold a FAA commercial pilot certificate and meet
hour minimums.4 6 3 It was uncontested that at the time of the
accident the pilot had not met the requirements. 464 The insurer
can avoid liability without showing that the pilot's failure to
meet the requirements was a cause of the accident.465 Aligning
its position with the majority, the court stated that a condition
such as pilot qualifications is significant to the insurer regarding
what it will insure and what premiums should be charged.4 66
The court noted that it would require a showing of a causal con-
nection for insurers to deny claims when the insured fails to
456 See Edmonds v. United States, 642 F.2d 877, 880-82 (1st Cir. 1981); U.S.
Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Cash Air, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Mass. 1991).
57 See Edmonds, 642 F.2d at 882; U.S. Aviation Undenoriters, Inc., 568 N.E.2d at
1152.
4 642 F.2d at 880.
459 Id.
460 Id.
461 Id. at 882.




466 Id. at 1152.
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"seasonably .. . notify an insurer of a loss," as opposed to a con-
dition precedent in the instant case.'
MICHIGAN
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.4 6 8 Michigan case law inter-
prets aviation insurance policies strictly according to contract
principles and explicitly differentiates contract principles from
tort principles. 6 ' Where the insurance policy language ex-
cludes coverage for particular conditions, it will be deemed not
to exist in the instance those conditions occur.470 Therefore,
once coverage is suspended, no causal question needs to arise.
2. Cases
a. Kilburn v. Union Marine & General Insurance Co.47 1
A policy provision stated that the policy did not cover damage
to the aircraft if it was operated in violation of Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) regulations.4 7 2 The insured was a student
pilot operating the aircraft with a passenger, which was in viola-
tion of CAA regulations.4 7 3 The insured hit some high tension
wires an hour into the flight.4 7 4 The pilot's actions were against
the CAA flight regulations, and the court held that the contract
provision was binding against the insured.4 7 5 The policy was a
valid and binding contract between the insurer and insured;
therefore, he was not covered in that circumstance and a causal
relation was not involved. 4 76 The court noted that this was not a
tort action where causal connections are frequently required.7
467 Id.




471 Id. at 90.
472 Id. at 91.
473 Id.
474 Id.
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MINNESOTA
1. Summary
No causal connection is required unless the contract language
requires such; however, the deciding case noted that the viola-
tion may have been a cause of the accident. 478 Courts utilize
strict contract construal in aviation insurance so that the causal
question is beyond the scope.4 7 9 Minnesota does have a statute
that addresses contracts including the causal connection, and it
prohibits excluding coverage if the aircraft is in violation of gov-
ernmental regulations.480
2. Cases & Statutes
a. Section 60A.081 of the Minnesota Statutes
This statute deals with contracts where the language requires
a causal connection. It prohibits the denial of coverage for any
loss arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an air-
craft if the contract excludes coverage because of a violation of
governmental regulations.8
b. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Hansen4 8 2
The insured pilot was performing dangerous dives with the
aircraft when it crashed.4 83 It was not clear if these aerobatic
moves or a mechanical failure caused the crash. The policy
provision provided that the policy does not apply to any insured
who performs aerobatics at the time of the incident.48 5 The
court held that because the pilot was performing aerobatics at
the time of the crash, the insured was beyond protection of the
policy regardless of causal connection. 48 6 The court reasoned
that there can be no liability where there was no assumption of
the risk.48 7
478 See Globe Indem. Co. v. Hansen, 231 F.2d 895, 897, 902-03 (8th Cir. 1956).
479 See id. at 897 (citing Giacomo v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins., 280 N.W. 653,
656 (Minn. 1938)).
40 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.081 (West 2009).
481 Id.
42 231 F.2d 895, 897 (8th Cir. 1956).
48 Id. at 905.
484 Id. at 902-03.
485 Id. at 904.
486 Id. at 906.






A causal connection is required.4 88 Mississippi courts require
the causal connection because if the risk the insurer is seeking
to avoid has no causal connection to the loss, then it is not cov-
ering anything additional."' Thus, the loss would have been in-
curred regardless of the breach."0
2. Cases
a. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. McDaniel"'
A pilot only had his student pilot's license and flew a multi-
engine plane with passengers in violation of CAA regulations.49
The insurance policy stated that it did not apply to any pilot
operating an aircraft in violation of federal regulations.4 9 3 The
pilot crashed the insured aircraft, and no cause of the accident
was intimated by either party. 9 The court held that because
the law in Mississippi requires a causal connection, the insurer
could not avoid liability under that exclusion.4 9 5 With "no
causal connection being shown between certification and rating
of ... [the] pilot ... and the crash itself, the exclusion relied on
by plaintiff may not be invoked to void the coverage afforded by
the policy."4 9 6
MISSOURI
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.9 Missouri case law rea-
sons that contract terms govern the insurance policy.49 8 There is
no need to show any additional element such as causation be-
4- See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 187 F. Supp. 614, 618 (N.D. Miss.
1960).
489 See Hossley v. Union Indem. Co. of N.Y., 102 So. 561, 562 (Miss. 1925).
49 See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 187 F. Supp. at 618.
491 Id.
492 Id. at 616.
493 Id. at 615.
494 Id. at 617-18.
495 Id. at 618.
496 Id. (citing Hossley v. Union Indem. Co. of N.Y., 102 So. 561 (Miss. 1925)
(holding that in an automobile accident, liability is maintained by the insurer
unless there is a causal connection between the injury and the crash)).
497 See Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
498 See id. at 892.
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cause when the excluded activity under the insurance policy
continues, it is as if the policy had never existed.4 9 9
2. Cases
a. Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Co.5 oo
A student pilot, who was not properly rated to be carrying pas-
sengers, crashed during a nighttime flight, killing all passengers
and himself."o' The insurance policy provided that it would not
cover student pilots who were not sufficiently rated.5 0 2 The in-
surer denied the claim, relying on the student pilot clause. 0 '
The court held that proof of a causal connection between the
pilot's certification and rating as a student pilot and the casualty
was unnecessary, and it reasoned that the insurer was entitled to
extend coverage only while the pilot was holding the proper cer-
tificate and rating, as required by the FAA for the flight in-
volved.5 04 The court upheld the aircraft insurance exclusionary
clauses on their literal terms.50 5 Moreover, the insurance cover-
age is suspended whenever operative facts of exclusion exist,
and contract terms are interpreted strictly with no need to show




A causal connection is required. 0 The reasoning of the
court was that it would be unfair to deny the insured coverage
for what it paid for over a technicality.508
4- See id. (citing Travelers' Protective Ass'n of Am. v. Prinsen, 291 U.S. 576,
582 (1934)).
500 Id. at 883.
5o Id. at 886-87.
502 Id. at 886.
503 Id. at 887.
504 Id. at 893.
505 Id. at 889.
506 Id. at 892.





a. Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc. 09
The aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff, and the pilot's medi-
cal certification had expired two months prior to the crash.510
Both parties stipulated that the expired certificate did not con-
tribute to the crash.5 1' However, the court did not interpret the
exclusion to include a lack of a medical certificate because the
policy did not state so expressly.512 But the court added that
even if it were included in the exclusion clause, a causal connec-
tion is required.5 13 To deny the insured the coverage he had
paid for where merely a technical breach occurred would be un-
fair. As the court explained:
The company inserted the medical certificate provision to guard
against the risk of loss which arises where a person of bad health
pilots an aircraft. In this case, [the pilot's] lack of medical certifi-
cation did not increase the risk of loss to the company, and the
insured's coverage will not be forfeited because of an alleged
technical breach of the policy. 514
NEBRASKA
1. Summary
No causal connection is required." The court's reasoning is
that insurers have the right to exclude certain risks from
coverage. 1
2. Cases
a. Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Co.
An insured pilot crashed when the brakes failed during land-
ing." The policy excluded coverage if the aircraft was not op-
erated by a pilot with valid pilot and medical certificates." The
pilot's medical certificate had lapsed five months prior to the
5o9 Id.
510 Id. at 1205.
511 Id.
512 Id. at 1207.
513 Id.
514 Id.
515 See Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d
162, 164 (Neb. 1973).
516 See id.
517 Id. at 611.
518 Id. at 612.
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accident, however, two days after the accident he renewed it.'
His expired license was not the cause of the accident. 52 0 The
court held that there was no coverage when the pilot did not
hold the medical certificates required under the policy, regard-
less of a causal connection.5 21 A renewal shortly thereafter did
not validate the certificate retroactively.522
NEVADA
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.5 2 3 Nevada case law indi-
cates a preference for strict contract construal? Its public pol-
icy favors a rule that encourages owners to meet all safety
regulations. 2
2. Cases
a. Griffin v. Old Republic Insurance Co.
The insured bought an airplane and crashed it into the plain-
tiffs backyard. 5 26 The plaintiff tried to collect from the insurer
but was denied because an exclusion in the policy denied cover-
age if the aircraft did not have proper airworthiness certifi-
cates.5 2 1 In an answer to a certified question, the court stated
that it cannot alter an unambiguous insurance contract unless it
is against public policy and that it will not attempt to increase
the legal obligations of the parties to a contract when the parties
intentionally limited such obligations.528 Consequently, it does
not imply a causal requirement when no causal language is pre-
sent. 29 Nevada will allow insurers to avoid liability under safety-
related exclusions if the provision is (1) "unambiguous, [(2)]
narrowly tailored, and [(3) is] essential to the risk undertaken
by the insurer."530
5e Id. at 611-12.
520 Id. at 614.
521 Id.
522 Id.
523 See Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 133 P.3d 251, 255 (Nev. 2006).
524 See id. at 253.
525 See id. (citing Sec. Ins. Co. v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246, 250 (Nev. 1988)).
526 Id. at 252-53.
527 Id. at 253.
528 Id. at 254 (citing Senteney v. Fire Ins. Exch., 707 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Nev.
1985)).
529 Id.




No causal connection is required."' New Hampshire courts
stress the freedom to contract as parties wish. 32 They look at
materiality to the extent it was meant to be included in the
policy.533
There are no cases or statutes in New Hampshire that directly
address the causal connection question. Some cases, although
not in the aviation context, seem to suggest that a causal con-
nection is not necessary for the insurer to avoid liability.
2. Cases
a. Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America 3 5
The insured falsely claimed in his insurance policy that he
had never had albumin in his urine. 36 His wife was denied a
claim on his life insurance policy in part because of a breach of
warranty-the false statement as to presence of albumin found
in his urine.3 There was no discussion of whether this condi-
tion was in any way related to or caused the insured's death, but
the court held that the insurer was not liable for the policy."'
The court evaluated the materiality of the misstatement and its
bearing on the risk.5 3 9 All the court requires for the insurer to
avoid liability is misrepresentation of information called for by
the contract and that the information has some bearing on the
soundness of the risk.54 0 The court further stated that the in-
surer is entitled to freedom to contract or not contract based on
the information gathered."4 '
531 See Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Keliher, 187 A. 473, 477 (N.H. 1936); Amos-
keag Trust Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 185 A. 2, 7 (N.H. 1936).
552 See Glens Falls Indem. Co., 187 A. at 474; Amoskeag Trust Co., 185 A. at 7.
53 See Glens Falls Indem. Co., 187 A. at 477; Amoskeag Trust Co., 185 A. at 6.
5s4 See Glens Falls Indem. Co., 187 A. at 477.
5s5 Amoskeag Trust Co., 185 A. at 2.
536 Id. at 4.
5 Id. at 3.
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b. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Kelihe542
The insured caused a car crash and was brought to trial. 43 A
policy condition required his cooperation in his defense but he
failed to appear in court.54 4 The court held that coverage was
not in effect when the condition was not met.545 Therefore, no
causal connection needs to be considered after a breach has
been established and the insurer was not liable for damage to
the third parties under the insured's policy.5 4 6
NEW JERSEY
1. Summary
No causal connection is usually required. 54 7 NewJersey courts
will generally not require a causal connection to relieve insurers
from liability, especially when the breach is significantly related
to the decision of the insurer to accept the risk.5 4 8 However,
courts decline to impose a bright-line rule and suggest that cer-
tain situations might require a causal connection.54 9 The courts
reason that in some factual situations imposing a causal connec-
tion requirement would allow an insured to expand coverage
without paying for it.55 o
2. Cases
a. Aviation Charters, Inc. v. Avemco Insurance Co.
The pilot did not have the 5,000 flight hours that served as a
requirement under the insurance policy.551 An accident oc-
curred as the pilot was taxiing on the runway just after land-
ing.5 5 2 A spring device malfunctioned and caused the nose to
collapse and damage the aircraft." The court held that under
the narrow facts of this case a lack of a causal relationship will
542 187 A. 473 (N.H. 1936).
543 Id. at 473-74.
544 Id.
545 Id. at 476 (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. Morris, 37 F.2d 90, 91 (9th Cir.
1929)).
546 Id. at 477.
547 See Aviation Charters, Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 712, 713 (N.J.
2001).
5- See id. at 714.
54 See id. at 713.
550 See id. at 715.
551 Id. at 713.
552 Id. at 712-13.
5 Id. at 713.
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not justify disregarding an unambiguous policy exclusion, such
as stating that the policy only applies when the pilot has over
5,000 flight hours.5 5 4 The insured was aware that it could have
obtained, for a higher premium, a policy that required fewer
total flight hours and that requiring a causal connection would
thus constitute an unbargained-for expansion of coverage. 5
The court does not adopt a per se rule, holding that the absence
of causality cannot be the basis for disregarding an unambigu-
ous exclusionary clause in an insurance policy and leaves "for
another day, the decision whether, in another factual context, it
would be appropriate to require a causal nexus before denying




No causal connection is required.5 5 ' New Mexico courts
strictly interpret insurance contracts without requiring a causal
connection between the exclusion and the breach, noting that
this furthers the public policy of safety.558
2. Cases
a. Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. O'Bien"
The private owner of an aircraft sought a claim against the
insurer after the aircraft he leased out collided with another
plane.5 6 0 The insurer denied the claim based on an exclusion
that precluded coverage unless the airworthiness certificate was
in full force and effect.5 6' The owner had failed to get an an-
nual inspection and, therefore, did not have a current airworthi-
ness certificate.5 6 2 However, there was no causal connection
between the lapse of the airworthiness certificate and the acci-
dent.56 3 The court held that the lack of a causal connection had
55 Id. at 714.
55 Id.
556 Id. at 715.
557 See Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 662 P.2d 639, 641 (N.M. 1983).
558 See id.
559 Id. at 639.
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no bearing on this case.66 4 Insurance coverage must not be af
forded to aircraft owners who ignore or refuse to comply with
established certification requirements that are commonly a part
of policy exclusions. 6 5 A causal connection does not have to be
shown when there is a specific and unambiguous policy exclu-
sion.5 "6 6 The court also stated that this rationale furthers safety:
The policy behind such exclusions is clear and unambiguous.
The exclusions encourage aircraft owners to obtain annual in-
spections of their aircraft in order to be certified by the F.A.A.
under current applicable Federal Aviation Regulations. These
regulations prohibit an aircraft owner from flying his aircraft un-
less an annual safety inspection is performed.
The court also distinguished between a "condition subsequent"
(a condition that causes coverage to be suspended) and a policy
exclusion, to which coverage was never extended. 6 8
NEW YORK
1. Summary
No causal connection is required." New York courts will in-
terpret insurance policies strictly, like a contract.570
2. Cases
a. Hedges Enterprises, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.
Under federal regulations, the aircraft owner was required to
register the aircraft.5 7 1 The student pilot had just purchased the
aircraft and was practicing a solo takeoff and landing when he
crashed during landing.5 7 2 He made a claim on the insurance
and was denied based on a policy provision that excluded cover-
age while the aircraft was being used for an unlawful purpose.7
Since he had not yet registered his aircraft he was therefore in
- Id. at 641.
565 Id.
566 Id. at 642.
567 Id. at 641.
56 Id. at 640-41.
569 See Hedges Enters., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 225 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784
(Sup. Ct. 1962) (citing Des Marais v. Thomas, 147 N.Y.S.2d 223, 226 (Sup. Ct.
1955), affd, 153 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 1956)).
570 See Gaetan v. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, 695 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (App.
Div. 1999).
57' Hedges Enters., Inc., 225 N.Y.S.2d at 783.




violation of the policy.574 The court held that " [i] t is not incum-
bent upon the insurer to show causal connection between the
loss and non-compliance with the terms of the exclusion clause
in order to preclude recovery."5 7 5 The coverage was suspended
when the aircraft was being used unlawfully-without proper re-




No causal connection is required.17 7 North Carolina courts
interpret aviation insurance policies strictly, differentiating this
type of contract claim from tort actions. 7
2. Cases
a. Baker v. Insurance Co. of North America
The insured, who held a valid pilot certificate but lapsed med-
ical certificates, crashed and sought to recover.5 7' He was in
good health at the time of the crash and shortly thereafter re-
newed his medical license.58 0 He was denied coverage under
the exclusion because "an insurance policy is a contract."581 The
court held that one must go by the policy's clear meaning, and
the policy said that the risk was excluded while being operated
by a pilot not properly certificated, not that the risk is excluded
if caused by the violation.8 The court said that under those cir-
cumstances, the coverage "simply did not exist."58 3
574 Id. at 784.
575 Id. (citing Des Marais v. Thomas, 147 N.Y.S.2d 223, 226 (Sup. Ct. 1955),
affd, 153 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 1956)).
576 Id. (quoting Traveler's Protective Ass'n of Am. v. Prinsen, 291 U.S. 576, 582
(1934)).
577 See Bruce v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 222 F.2d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1955)
(citing Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 99 F.2d 485, 491 (4th Cir. 1938));
Baker v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 179 S.E.2d 892, 894 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
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b. Bruce v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. 5 8 4
An accident occurred during an air show where the pilot of
the aircraft performed aerobatic maneuvers, but fell to the
ground and crashed, killing himself and a passenger.5 8 5 The in-
surance policy stated it would not apply if the aircraft was used
in violation of government regulations.-" The federal regula-
tions required all passengers engaged in aerobatics to be
equipped with parachutes.5 " Although neither was equipped
with a parachute, evidence showed that the device would not
have been able to save their lives because the pilot continued to
spin so near to the ground." The court held that an insurer
"need not show a causal connection between the breach of an
exclusion clause and the accident."8 9 It further explained that
the rights of the parties come from the contract, and not from a
claim arising out of a tort.5 9 0
NORTH DAKOTA
1. Summary
A causal connection is probably required.59 ' North Dakota
courts look to the quality of the relationship between the loss
and the cause when applying the efficient cause doctrine.9
This applies when there are concurrent causes of a loss under a
policy." The court will not exclude coverage if the excluded
activity was not the greater cause of the loss.594
There are no cases or statutes that directly address the issue of
the causal connection in aviation insurance.
5- 222 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1955).
5 Id. at 643.
586 Id. at 644.
587 Id. at 643.
588 Id. at 643-44.
589 Id. at 645.
59o Id.
591 See Cont'1 W. Ins. Co. v. Dam Bar, 478 N.W.2d 373, 374 (N.D. 1991).
5- See id. at 375-76.




a. Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Dam Bar 95
In this case, an exclusion in a bar owner's policy stated that
insurance does not apply to damage by reason of " [t]he furnish-
ing of alcoholic beverages to a person under the legal drinking
age or under the influence of alcohol."5  The bar owner served
alcohol to a 19-year-old minor, who was subsequently killed in
an automobile accident."5 1 While no one denied that the ex-
cluded risk contributed to the loss, the bar owner argued that
coverage cannot be defeated by the contributing excluded risk if
the "efficient cause" is covered."' The court agreed, but in this
particular circumstance no other causes were asserted that
could be the basis for liability."' Although the court supports
the efficient proximate cause doctrine, it did not apply in this
case.60 This doctrine allows liability to be denied if the efficient
cause is not covered, and it requires coverage if the efficient
cause is covered, despite the presence of the two conflicting
causes. This doctrine shows the court's deference to causation
in determining the insurer's liability under exclusions.
OHIO
1. Summary
A causal connection is considered but is not required when
the condition breached was relevant and material to the issu-
ance of insurance coverage. 01 Ohio courts do not favor forfeit-
ures or unjust avoidance of insurance coverage, but will not
require the connection if the breached provision was material to
the initial issuance of coverage. 0 2
No cases or statutes directly address causal connection in avia-
tion insurance.
>5 Id. at 373,
596 Id. at 375.
597 Id. at 374.
598 Id. at 376.
599 Id.
600 Id.
601 See Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Estate of Gerkens, 591 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ohio
1990).
602 See Meadors v. Progressive Specialty Ins., No. 91-T-4514, 1991 WL 268945, at
*6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1991).
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2. Cases
a. American Continental Insurance Co. v. Estate of Gerkensos
An unlicensed pilot crashed.6 o' He made misrepresentations
about his pilot status that would have had a material effect on
the insurer's decision in issuing the insurance policy (i.e.,
fraud).co0 Therefore, the court found that the insurance agree-
ment void and the insurer was not required to show a causal
connection to avoid coverage.60o This, however, is a limited
opinion.o" The court conceded there was no evidence of a cas-
ual connection between lack of proper certification and the ac-
cident, but held coverage was void due to the fraudulent
representation on a material aspect of the policy.608 It seem-
ingly considered the causal connection but denied coverage on
other grounds. In other words, the court in this case did not
require a causal connection but it did not explicitly hold that
there is no such requirement; perhaps the insurer would have
been liable under the policy because of the lack of causal re-
quirement but for the material fraud which made the policy
void.
b. Meadors v. Progressive Specialty Insuranc 09
An insured motorcyclist was injured in an accident with an
uninsured motorist.610 His policy required that he keep the mo-
torcycle in a "garage," but it was actually kept in a barn struc-
ture.6 1 The court held that the insurer was liable for coverage
despite the finding that this was a misrepresentation of warranty
that would void the policy. 12 The reason for this finding was
the lack of causal connection between the breach and the in-
sured's loss.' The court further explained that " [i] t would be
manifestly unjust to permit the appellant to avoid coverage
under the specific facts of this case."614
6o3 Estate of Gerkens, 591 N.E.2d at 774.
604 Id. at 776.
-o Id. at 775-76.
6 See id. at 779.
6o7 See id.
-o See id.
-on No. 91-T-4514, 1991 WL 268945 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1991).
610 Id. at *1.
611 Id.
612 Id. at *5.
613 Id. at *6.




No causal connection is required.615 Oklahoma courts reason
that they will not rewrite insurance contracts and that it is rea-
sonable for insurers to exclude activity that increases the risk of
loss under contract principles. 16
2. Cases
a. Avemco Insurance Co. v. Whit 3 17
The insured crashed with an expired airworthiness certifi-
cate. 6 18 His policy excluded coverage if the airworthiness certifi-
cate was not in full force and effect.6 19 The court held that
ambiguities in insurance contracts must be strictly construed in
favor of the insured, but in the absence of actual doubt about
the meaning of the contract, the court will not rewrite the pol-
icy's terms simply because doing so would favor the insured.6 2 0
The court further stated that it saw no reason to deprive the
insurer of the exclusion's benefit.621
The court was responding to this certified question: "Whether
an Airworthiness Certificate exclusion in an aircraft liability pol-
icy is contrary to Oklahoma public policy, and unenforceable
when no causal link has been shown between the crash of the
aircraft and the failure to have a 'Standard' Category Airworthi-
ness Certificate?" 622 The court held that it was not contrary to
public policy and the insurer was not required to show a causal
link between the crash and the absence of a certificate in order
to deny coverage.6 2 3
615 See Avemco Ins. Co. v. White, 841 P.2d 588, 589 (Okla. 1992).
616 See id. at 591.
617 Id. at 588.
618 Id. at 589.
619 Id.
620 Id. at 590.
621 Id. at 591.
622 Id. at 589.
623 Id.
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OREGON
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.6 2 4 Oregon courts interpret
aviation insurance contracts strictly.' While the violation con-
tinues, the insurance is suspended as if it had never been in
force. 626
2. Cases
a. Ochs v. Avemco Insurance Co.6 27
The insured did not perform his aircraft's annual inspection
within the twelve months preceding the accident, which means
the aircraft was not appropriately certificated.6 28 The policy cov-
ering damage to the aircraft excluded property damage to an
aircraft that did not have a current airworthiness certificate.6 2 9
The insured "was in the process of landing the aircraft . . .
[when] [i] t ground-looped and flipped on its back."6 3 0 "The
cause of the accident was a defective or broken tail wheel
spring. The court held that "the insurer is entitled to ex-
clude any liability for aircraft not bearing a valid and current
airworthiness certificate."6 32 Thus, no proof of a causal connec-
tion between the accident and the policy exclusion was re-




A causal connection is required.3 A Pennsylvania statute re-
quires that any denial of insurance coverage based on an exclu-
sion have a causal link between the excluded behavior and the
loss. 634
624 See Ochs v. Avemco Ins. Co., 636 P.2d 421, 424 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
625 See id.
626 See id.
627 Id. at 421.




632 Id. at 424.





a. Section 5503(d) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
(Liability of Insurer)
The relevant provision reads: "No insurer shall deny coverage
under an exclusion in an agreement where there is no causal
connection between the exclusion and any loss resulting from
any accident." 3 5
PUERTO RICO
1. Summary
No causal connection is required for breach of a condition
precedent.13 1 Puerto Rico courts utilize the principle of strict
contract construal."
2. Cases
a. United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Producciones Padosa, Inc.13 8
An exclusion found in an aircraft policy provided that if the
pilot did not meet standards set forth in the pilot clause, cover-
age was void.63' A pilot crashed upon takeoff and the insurer
denied coverage for the aircraft based on a claim that the pilot
did not have the requisite amount of flight hours required by
the policy and therefore was not covered. 64 0 The court held that
the pilot clause was a condition precedent and when the condi-
tion precedent was breached, coverage was suspended.64 1 The
court did not directly address the causal connection, but infer-
ring from the lack of its application, the court did not apply it in
this type of situation. It is unclear if a causal connection is re-
quired for a representation or warranty.
635 Id.
636 See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Producciones Padosa, Inc., 835 F.2d 950, 955 (1st
Cir. 1987) (applying Puerto Rico law).
637 See id. at 457.
- Id. at 950.
63 Id. at 951.
6- Id. at 952.
-1 Id. at 955.
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RHODE ISLAND
1. Summary
A causal connection is probably required.6 4 2 Rhode Island
courts do not adhere to strict contract construal. The courts do,
however, consider insurance contracts to be unbalanced, with
negotiation power favoring the insurer.6 4 3 Because prejudice to
the insurer must be shown to avoid liability for the breach of
notice provision, Rhode Island courts would likely require more
than just a showing of a breach.6 4 4 However, no cases or statutes
were found that directly addressed this issue.
2. Cases
a. Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co.6 45
The insurance policy required notice of an accident "as soon
as practicable."6 46 The insured gave notice four months after
the accident, and the insurer denied liability based on the
breach of notice provision.'e647 court held that an insurance
contract is not a negotiated contract but a contract of adhe-
sion.6 4 8 The state supreme court adopted the opinion from a
New Jersey case, which stated that "an insurance policy is not a
true consensual arrangement but one that is available to the pre-
mium-paying customer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis."6 49 There-
fore, the court required the insurer to show prejudice caused by
the breach in order to avoid liability on breach of the notice
provision."' The court stated, "We do not believe that a techni-
cal breach of the notice provisions in a policy should bar an
insured from recovering the benefits for which he has paid."'
While this language does not require a causal connection,
under this reasoning it is likely the court would prefer the causa-
tion link.
642 See Pickering v. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 584, 593 (R.I. 1971).
63 See id.
644 See id.
645 Id. at 584.
6 Id. at 592.
s4 Id.
64 Id. at 598 n.8.
-9 Id. at 593 (citing Cooper v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870 (N.J. 1968)).
650 Id.





A causal connection is required.6 5 2 South Carolina courts
have consistently held that insurers should not be able to avoid
coverage on a mere technicality.1 3 The courts reason that
"when the parties made the contract of insurance, they were not
inserting a mere arbitrary provision, but that it was the purpose
of the insurance company to relieve itself of liability from acci-
dents caused by the excluded condition."6 M
2. Cases
a. Gardner Trucking Co., Inc. v. South Carolina Insurance
Guarantee Association5"5
The insurance policy excluded coverage when the aircraft was
operated without an airworthiness certificate and the pilot
lacked a minimum number of hours. 6 This aircraft did not
have an airworthiness certificate and the pilot did not have the
amount of flight hours required by the policy.657 The pilot dam-
aged the aircraft when its landing gear malfunctioned during
landing.658 The court held that the lack of experience exclusion
and airworthiness certificate exclusion relieved the insurer when
the insured failed to dispute the causal connection.6' The
court found that the breaches were causally related and there-
fore excluded coverage on those grounds.6 o
b. McGee v. Globe Indemnity Co.661
The insurer denied coverage based on a provision that the
policy did not apply when the automobile was driven by persons
under sixteen years of age. 662 The collision occurred when a
fifteen-year-old was driving the automobile.6 3 The court as-
652 See Gardner Trucking Co., Inc. v. S.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 376 S.E.2d 260, 262
(S.C. 1989).
653 See id.
654 S.C. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358, 361-62 (S.C. 1977).
655 376 S.E.2d at 260.
656 Id. at 262.
657 Id.
658 Id. at 261.
659 Id. at 262.
660 Id. (relying on S.C. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 237 S.E.2d 358, 361-62 (S.C. 1977)).
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sumed that the driver's age had no causal connection to the ac-
cident.66 The court held that the insurer was not exempted
from liability merely because the driver was under sixteen, in the
absence of a causal connection between the age of the driver
and the collision.6 65
c. Reynolds v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee 6 6
A city ordinance held that it was a violation to ride in the run-
ning board of a truck.6 6 7 An insured's policy excluded losses
sustained while committing a violation of the law. 6 68 Although
the insured was riding on the running board of the truck at the
time of the accident, the court held that to defeat recovery
under policies excluding or limiting liability for death or injury
from an unlawful act, a direct causative connection between
such act and the death or injury must be shown.669 The court's
rationale was that parties to an insurance contract are not in-
serting mere arbitrary provisions, but rather they have specific
purposes to limit liability from accidents caused by the excluded
condition.e6o
d. South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Collins671
The policy stated that only a pilot with an effective medical
certificate will operate the aircraft in flight.6 72 The insured's
medical certificate expired three months before the crash.17 1
Both parties stipulated that there was no causal connection be-
tween its expiration and the accident. 6 74 This is the first aircraft
liability case in which causal connection was considered in
South Carolina. The court found that the reasoning in automo-
bile cases was no less compelling in this situation, therefore, a
causal connection must be shown between the accident and the
failure to have a valid medical certificate.6 7 5
664 Id. at 850.
665 Id.
666 164 S.E. 602 (S.C. 1932).
667 Id. at 602-03.
668 Id. at 602.
669 Id. at 603-04.
670 Id. at 603.
671 237 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1977).
672 Id. at 360.
673 Id. at 359.
674 Id. at 362.
675 See id. at 361 (citing Reynolds v. Life & Cas. Ins. of Tenn., 164 S.E. 602 (S.C.





No causal connection is required.7 6 South Dakota case law
reasons that normal contract interpretation requires suspension
of coverage, and enforcement encourages safety among aircraft
owners and operators."
2. Cases
a. Economic Aero Club, Inc. v. Avemco Insurance Co. 6 11
This policy excluded coverage when the aircraft was operated
by a pilot without a current and effective medical certificate.67 9
A member of the non-profit club was operating the aircraft
owned by that non-profit and crashed, destroying the aircraft.so
The pilot's medical certificate had expired four months prior to
the crash, and he renewed it four days after the crash.681 The
insurer refused to indemnify based on the exclusion, and the
court held for the insurer.8 2 It concluded that any coverage
shift is better left to the legislature and noted that other jurisdic-
tions have passed anti-technicality statutes.8 In addition, the
exclusion encourages owners and operators of aircraft to obey




A causal connection is likely required." All Tennessee cases
addressing this question provide this statement as a rationale:
"Suppose a man violates the law against profanity and is shot
676 See Econ. Aero Club, Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 644, 646 (S.D.
1995).
677 See id. at 645-46.
678 Id. at 644.
679 Id. at 645.
o Id.
681 Id.
682 Id. at 646.
683 Id.
684 Id.
65 See S. Ins. Co. v. Graham, 280 S.W. 30, 31 (Tenn. 1926).
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while so doing, should that absolve the company from
liability?"686
No cases specifically address the causal connection in the avia-
tion context.
2. Cases
a. Accident Insurance Co. of North America v. Bennett"87
A life insurance policy excluded coverage for injunes in-
curred "while engaged in or in consequence of any unlawful
act."' 8 The insured and his mistress were found dead from
gunshot wounds.18 9 He had been living with her "in a state of
fornication."6 9 0 The insurer claimed that it was relieved from
liability on insured's life insurance policy because of his partici-
pation in unlawful activities (fornication)."'9 First, the court
said that fornication, while maybe immoral, was not unlawful
unless open and notorious. Second, if this act were unlawful
per se it would not relieve the insurer from liability because
there must be some causal connection.693 This is based on the
reasoning that the consequence should naturally flow from the
prohibited activity and should be reasonably anticipated.6 9 4
b. Southern Insurance Co. v. Graham' 5
The insurance policy in this case precluded coverage during
acts in violation of the law.19 6 A man was transporting whiskey
illegally.6 " During his car trip, the insured stopped, inspected
the automobile's gasoline leakage and, when twenty feet away
from the automobile, lit a cigarette which ignited the gasoline
from his clothing.69 8 The court held that, even though the in-
686 E.g., Graham, 280 S.W. at 31; Accident Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Bennett, 16 S.W.
723, 725 (Tenn. 1891).
-7 16 S.W. at 723.
688 Id. at 725.
69 Id. at 723-24.




694 Id. at 725-26; see also Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hargraves, 88 S.W.2d 451
(Tenn. 1935) (holding that there was a causal connection between the excluded
violation of the law and the accident which precluded insurance coverage).
695 280 S.W. 30 (Tenn. 1926).
696 Id. at 30-31.
697 Id. at 30.
698 Id.
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sured was violating the law, there was no causal connection be-
tween his whiskey transportation and his burns so the insurance
coverage was not precluded.'
TEXAS
1. Summary
A causal connection is required.7 0 0 Texas courts reason that it
would be unconscionable and against public policy to allow in-
surers to avoid coverage on a technicality.7 1
2. Cases
a. Puckett v. United States Fire Insurance Co.70 2
The policy had an exclusion that suspended coverage "if the
aircraft . . . airworthiness certificate is not in full force and ef-
fect."o7 0  The insured crashed due to pilot error.70o The in-
sured's certificate had lapsed but both parties stipulated that
this did not cause the accident.70 The court held that an avia-
tion liability insurer could not avoid liability under an insurance
policy on the basis of an insured's breach of policy unless there
was a causal connection between the breach and the loss. 706
The court's reasoning was that it would be unconscionable and
against public policy to allow an aviation insurer to avoid liability
when the breach of a contract did not contribute to the loss and
the breach amounted to nothing more than a technicality.0 7
b. AIG Aviation (Texas), Inc. v. Holt Helicopters, Inc.7 0
The insurance policy required a minimum of 1,000 hours of
flight experience. 09 Property damage occurred due to a crash
in which the pilot did not have the requisite flight hours.7 10 The
trial court held that the insurer had the burden to show a causal
699 Id. at 31.
700 See Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 937-38 (Tex. 1984).
701 See id. at 938.
702 Id. at 936.
70 Id. at 937.
704 Id. at 938.
705 Id. at 937.
706 Id. at 939.
707 Id. at 938.
708 198 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
7o Id. at 278-79.
710 Id. at 279.
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connection between the lack of flight time and the crash.'
The jury found no causal connection and awarded exemplary
damages against the insurer.712 The court of appeals ruled it
was bound to follow Puckett and affirmed the trial court's ruling
on the insurer's burden to show a causal connection and the
trial court's judgment against the insurer.xs Puckett was upheld
when the Texas Supreme Court (with a completely different
composition than the Puckett Court) denied review. 14
UTAH
1. Summary
A causal connection is probably required.7 15 The state courts
are reluctant to take away bargained-for coverage.7 1 6 There are
no cases or statutes on point with the causal connection issue in
aviation insurance policies. However, it can be reasoned that
Utah would be likely to require a causal connection because of
its tendencies to require a causal connection in situations such
as strict accident policies in which there is another existing med-
ical condition. 1 7
2. Cases
a. Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Co.
This insurance policy covered death of the insured and paid
double for a death solely from an accident.718 This double in-
demnity benefit excluded a death that "resulted from physical
or mental infirmities."7 1 9 The insured accidentally slipped and
fell on ice, breaking his arm and causing a dissecting aneurism
of the aorta; he died a few weeks later.7 2 0 The court ultimately
found that an existing high blood pressure condition concur-
rently contributed to his death and, therefore, prevented the
double indemnity benefit. 7 2 ' Although this particular policy
711 Id. at 278.
712 Id. at 279.
71 Id. at 279-80 (citing Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 936 (Tex.
1984)).
714 248 S.W.3d 169, 169 (Tex. 2008).
715 See Tucker v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 155 P.2d 173, 176 (Utah 1945).
716 See id. at 176-77.
717 See id. at 176.
718 Id.
719 Id. at 174.
720 Id.
721 Id. at 175-76.
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used causal language ("resulted") the court gave relevant gen-
eral law from previous cases. 2 The rule in this jurisdiction is to
give liberal construction to the policy in favor of the insured to
"accomplish the purpose for which the insurance was taken out
and for which the premium was paid."7 23 Specifically, courts in-
terpret a clause covering "[a]n injury effected through violent,
external, and accidental means, entirely independent of all
other causes" to mean that an existing disease will not bar an




A causal connection is not required but a misrepresentation
breach must be material to the decision to the issuance of the
policy.725 Courts require a misrepresentation to be material
before insurers can deny coverage. 2
There are no cases that directly address the causal connection
issue but the following cases address misrepresentations in in-
surance policies. They imply that immaterial breaches will not
cause a forfeiture in coverage except when the breach has a rela-
tionship to the acceptance of the risk by the insurer.727 This
could encompass some non-causally related breaches.
2. Cases
a. McAllister v. Avemco Insurance Co. 72 1
This insured represented that he had the aircraft's annual in-
spection done in the last twelve months, when in fact he had
not.7 2 9 The insured crashed but there was no evidence that the
cause of the crash was related to the failure to have an annual
inspection. 73 0 The insurer denied coverage based on that mis-
representation.7 3 1 Breach by misrepresentation in an aviation
722 Id. at 175.
723 Id.
724 Id.
725 See McAllister v. Avemco Ins. Co., 528 A.2d 758, 759 (Vt. 1987).
726 See Martell v. Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 564 A.2d 584, 588 (Vt.
1989).
727 See Martell, 564 A.2d at 587-88; McAllister, 528 A.2d at 759.
728 528 A.2d at 758.
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insurance policy is governed by statute.7 3 2 This requires a causal
connection not between the breach and the loss, but between
the breach and the decision of the insurer to issue the policy.7 3
If the misrepresentation has a material effect on whether the
insurer would have issued the policy, it will void the policy. 734
b. Martell v. Universal Underwriters Life Insurance Co. 7 3 -
The court held that even an innocent misrepresentation will
preclude coverage under a life insurance policy if it is mate-
rial. 6 The health statement in an application for a life insur-
ance policy was held material as a matter of law when the
insurer is concerned with a specific risk.
VIRGINIA
1. Summary
No causal connection is required.7 3  However, in the original
case deciding the rule, a violation likely caused the crash. 3
The Virginia court reasoned that it must enforce the contract as
made by the parties because premiums are based on the fact
that the policy does not cover certain more hazardous risks.7 4 0
The court differentiated between contract and tort principles.7 4 1
2. Cases
a. United States Specialty Insurance Co. v. Skymaster of Virginia,
Inc.742
The insured made a crash landing, damaging the aircraft.
He had not disclosed his diabetes condition on his medical cer-
tificate application.74 4 The policy exclusion suspended coverage
732 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4205 (West 2010).
73 See id.
734 See id.
735 564 A.2d 584 (Vt. 1989).
736 Id. at 588.
73 Id. at 587.
7- See U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Skymaster of Va., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 995,
1003 (E.D. Va. 2000).
73 See Powell Valley Elec. Coop., Inc. v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 179 F.
Supp. 616, 619 (W.D. Va. 1959).
70 Skymaster, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
741 Id.
742 Id. at 995.
743 Id. at 996.
7- Id. at 997.
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if the pilot did not have a current and proper medical certifi-
cate.7 45 The pilot's certificate was deemed not current and
proper due to the misrepresentations made regarding his diabe-
tes condition. 74 6 The court held that no causal connection was
required between the pilot's lack of a proper medical certificate
and the crash in order to void the policy.74 7 The court relied on
several theories in reaching its final holding that (1) this is con-
tract, not tort, (2) it does not violate public policy to require the
pilot to have a proper certification, and (3) the court will not re-
contract for the parties.7 4 8
b. Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. United States Aviation
Underwriters, Inc.749
This policy covered a specific pilot and excluded coverage
while the aircraft was used in flight instruction.7 0 The helicop-
ter had dual controls, and the insured let the student take over
part of the flight.7 5 1 The student made a risky turn and the heli-
copter crashed despite the pilot retaking the controls in an at-
tempt to fix the error.5 2 The court held that it does not matter
what caused the crash because it was under the exclusion and,
therefore, coverage was suspended."
WASHINGTON
1. Summary
A causal connection is required for breached warranties.7 5 4
Washington courts require insurers to show a causal connection
regarding warranties because they believe it is reasonable to
think that a person (1) would consider whether the clause in
question was meant to relieve the insurer from liability resulting
from the proscribed activities and (2) would not assume that the
insurer was inserting a mere arbitrary provision. 5 5
745 Id. at 998.
746 Id. at 999.
747 Id. at 1002-03.
748 Id. at 1002.
749 179 F. Supp. 616 (W.D. Va. 1959).
750 Id. at 617.
751 Id.
752 Id.
753 Id. at 619.
754 See Riordan v. Com. Travelers Mut. Ins. Co., 525 P.2d 804, 808 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974).
755 See id. at 807.
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There are no aviation causal connection cases or statutes.
2. Cases
a. Riordan v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Insurance Co. 7 11
This automobile policy excluded coverage when the insured
was intoxicated. 5 7 An auto accident occurred when a truck
driver blocked traffic and was the sole cause of the accident.7 5 8
The insured was a passenger who was intoxicated.7 5 9 The court
held that coverage was not suspended because the insurer must
show a causal connection between the intoxication and the acci-
dent in order to avoid coverage.7 6 0 This is specific to the intoxi-
cation clause.
b. Highlands Insurance Co. v. Koetjev7
This policy warranties provided that the boat was not to ex-
ceed one crew member for a certain period and that it was con-
fined to the waters of Norton Sound.76 2 A crew member was
injured when the boat was in waters outside of Norton Sound
and there was an extra crew member.6 3 Washington law is char-
acterized as requiring that a "relation" between the breach and
loss to avoid insurance coverage, not that the breach actually
caused the loss.7 6 4 The court denied a motion to dismiss because
a fact issue existed as to what the relationship was between the
breach and the loss.76 " Further, the court stated that those




A causal connection is considered through the "efficient prox-
imate cause" doctrine. 67 West Virginia courts look at the qual-
756 Id. at 804.
757 Id. at 805.
758 Id. at 806.
759 Id.
70 Id. at 807-08.
761 651 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Wash 1987).
762 Id. at 347.
763 Id.
764 Id.
765 Id. at 349.
766 Id.
767 See W.Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mathews, 543 S.E.2d 664, 665 (W. Va. 2000).
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ity of the relationship and will only deny coverage if the
predominating cause of the loss is excluded.' 68
There are no cases or statutes that address the causal connec-
tion requirement.
2. Cases
a. West Virginia Fire & Casualty Co. v. MathewS76 9
The insured had a homeowner's policy that covered, among
other causes, damage caused by a vehicle but not by vandalism
or malicious acts.7 7 o An alleged imposter, pretending to be the
insured, contacted a contractor and had him level the house.
The insured claimed that the insurer was liable because the
house was leveled using a vehicle.7 7 2 The insurer, however, de-
nied liability because of the malicious act of vandalism by the
imposter.77 The court held that when a loss is caused by a com-
bination of covered- and specifically-excluded risks, the loss is
covered if the covered risk was the efficient proximate cause of
the loss. 7 74 "No coverage exists for a loss if the covered risk was
only a remote cause of the loss, or conversely, if the excluded
risk was the efficient proximate cause of the loss."7 75 "The effi-
cient proximate cause is the risk that sets others in motion," or
"the predominating cause of the loss."776 Further, the court ex-
plained that "[i]t is not necessarily the last act in a chain of
events, nor is it the triggering cause. The efficient proximate
cause doctrine looks to the quality of the links in the chain of
causation. "' Therefore, because the imposter's malicious acts
set the acts of the contractor into motion, the coverage was sus-
pended and the insurer was not liable. 7
7- See id.
769 Id. at 664.








778 Id. at 669.
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WISCONSIN
1. Summary
No causal connection is required."7 Wisconsin courts reason
that an insurer's liability is contractual and not based on tort.7s0
A violation suspends coverage and, therefore, it is irrelevant to
whether the accident was caused by the violation.8
There are no aviation cases or statutes that address this issue.
2. Cases
a. Witzko v. Koenig7 8 2
The insured was a fifteen-year-old who was excluded from cov-
erage under the automobile insurance policy because of a viola-
tion of an age restriction, which included driving at night under
the age of sixteen.8 The insured got into an accident at night,
although the accident was not causally related to his age. 784 The
court held that it was committed to upholding insurance poli-




There is probably no causal connection required.7 8 ' The
court strictly interprets the contract, focusing on the single mat-
ter of whether the activity fell under the exclusion, without con-
templating a causal connection between that activity and the
accident.787
779 See Witzko v. Koenig, 272 N.W. 864, 867 (Wis. 1937).
780 Id.
781 Id.
782 Id. at 864.
783 Id. at 866.
784 Id. at 867.
785 Id.




a. Ranger Insurance Co. v. Cates78
The policy excluded coverage for any losses involving taking
off or landing anywhere other than an "airport."7 8 9 The insured
did not want the "off-airport" exclusion, but his agent told him
"there should be no problem" and the exclusion was left in the
policy.790 The insured crashed shortly after taking off from a
hard-packed dirt surface, though it was unclear if the dirt sur-
face was a cause of the accident.791 The trial court found that a
modification took the "off-airport" exclusion out of the policy
and the loss was covered, and the court of appeals affirmed.9
The insurer argued that the failure to include a no causal con-
nection requirement jury instruction brought the issue of proxi-
mate cause into the case.79" The court disagreed and found
there was no error.79 4 The opinion implied that there is no
causal connection requirement, but the court did not make ex-
plicit statements regarding the issue.
788 Id. at 1255.
789 Id. at 1257 n.1.
790 Id. at 1257-58.
791 See id. at 1258, 1260.
792 Id. at 1259-60.
793 Id.
794 Id.
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